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If I had an hour to solve a problem and my life depended on the solution, I 
would spend the first 55 minutes determining the proper question to ask, 
for once I know the proper question, I could solve the problem in less than 
five minutes. –Albert Einstein1 
 
For most of its history, and much of the foreseeable future, America has been and 
will be embroiled in increasingly complex foreign conflicts that involve significant 
portions or the whole of native societies. These are called “wars amongst the people.”2  
Wars amongst the people directly involve populations and various political entities that 
are motivated and enabled by many simultaneous factors3 and mobilized and resourced 
according to social structures.4  Because of the primacy of these non-military factors, 
modern industrial militaries are not well-suited for war amongst the people.5  A primary 
characteristic of modern conflict complexity is the deliberate secrecy surrounding group 
members’ participation, resources, and activities that creates an informational cloak that 
makes their networks and activities difficult to distill from the surrounding society. 
Networks that are inherently illicit and necessarily secretive for survival, such as terrorist, 
insurgent, or organized crime networks, are known as dark networks.6 
Fighting dark networks, a form of irregular warfare, is considerably different from 
conventional warfare between industrial state militaries. Conventional warfare involves 
massive formations of troops and machines dependent upon superior technology, 
firepower and significant, tailored logistical burdens unified in the sole purpose of 
destroying an opponent’s military might and political will to fight through attrition of 
men, materials and psychological cohesion. Conventional warfare has been the basis for 
structuring our modern military organizational patterns, weapons procurement, our 
command and control methods and supporting technologies, and our analytical and 
operational methods. We have established hierarchical organizational and procedural 
models to maintain maximal control of information and actions. These organizational and 
doctrinal structures, and accompanying philosophies and technolgies, were never 
 2 
intended for anything other than conventional* war.7 Thus, the American military is, as a 
whole, unprepared for irregular warfare. Irregular warfare, or IW, is the domain where 
dark networks reign. 
Within the U.S. military, however, there is a little-known process that is much 
better suited to meet the challenge of fighting dark networks. The U.S. Army’s Special 
Forces community, or SF, has a long and very successful history focused on influencing 
indigenous social structures and developing native military and paramilitary forces.8 But 
even their deep cultural understanding via routine close contact with the native 
populations in conflict zones is not enough to be fully successful in wars amongst the 
people. SF have a process for analysis and intervention that possesses a frame that is 
moderately well-suited to wars amongst the people, though it was not created for that 
purpose. That process is called the Special Forces Target Analysis, which feeds the 
Special Operations Targeting Process. Unfortunately, it views the world as hierarchically-
dependent and static systems employing linear and additive casual loops. And therein lies 
the shortcoming of the current model of analysis. 
A better theoretical basis is in complexity theory, with systems theory and social 
network theory describing the basis of a new model using the tenets of SF Target 
Analysis. Complexity theory accounts for an organic structural and dynamically 
interactive set of relations and frames the world as a network of networks, which enables 
application of social network analysis, or SNA, of actors and relations between actors. 
Combine this “network of networks”9approach with a similar analogy, a “system of 
systems,”10 and it becomes clear that these frames are similar enough to allow knowledge 
of the social aspect of current and future conflict environments to be extremely insightful 
and useful information for actors, such as the military, attempting to understand and 
intervene in foreign wars amongst the people using a blend of SNA and SF Target 
Analysis. 
                                                 
* This assessment includes the current U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency 
manual, FM 3-24, and its joint military publication counterpart, JP 3-24.  The current version 
(December, 2006) of the manual was written with Iraq (c. 2005) in mind, not as a generalized 
doctrine for universal applicability, though it has been applied in Afghanistan with poor effect.   
 3 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis is intended to accomplish three things. First, it shows how the 
complexity of war amongst the people—specifically, warfare against dark networks—
highlights a critical shortcoming in our military capabilities. Second, it describes and 
stitches together the Special Operations Targeting Process, specifically SF Target 
Analysis, and SNA, showing how the combined methodology offers not only 
conceptualizations of the environment, but also an improved methodology for framing, 
describing, analyzing and proscribing solutions in complex social conflict environments. 
Lastly, this thesis tests the usefulness of this hybrid methodology using an unclassified 
dataset, highlighting this type of analysis and then deriving an intervention strategy from 
that analysis. This methodology distills key players and mechanisms from a complex 
environment and enables micro-analysis of those key players and mechanisms for 
intervention according to the intent and information requirements of a chosen 
intervention method. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In spite of a long history of engaging in irregular warfare, warfare in the 21st 
century has proved to be radically different from what the American military had 
envisioned or prepared. Warfare continues to evolve. The Jominan and Clausewitzian 
traditions of warfare thought has not culminated in a doctrine that is well-suited to the 
social context wars amongst the people.11  In order to fight the current conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the American military has paved a major tangent to its attrition 
warfare tradition in an attempt to meet the enemy in the correct domain: war amongst the 
people. Yet, in spite of twice moving toward an appropriate counterinsurgency doctrine 
and array of supporting tactics while in conflict, first under the Phoenix Program12 with 
the CORDS system in Vietnam13 and second through Village Stability Operations in 
Afghanistan,14 the U.S. military has retained its industrial-age, attrition-based 
conventional roots, while facing an undeniably unconventional conflict.15  So, it remains 
to be seen how the U.S. military will develop a set of doctrines for strategy and tactics fit 
for future irregular warfare engagements. 
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The U.S. military’s struggle for fitness does not come from incompetence, but 
from growing complexity in our conflict and political environments and a long-standing 
disparity between our model of warfare used to design our military and the actual 
environments that dominate our military’s deployments. In an analysis of 211 years of 
American military history, the country has been involved in over 300 instances of armed 
intervention.16  Yet, this number includes only 11 declared wars, plus some extended 
campaigns (i.e., Korea and Vietnam). In the decade from 1998–2008, only four of the 30 
major conflicts in action were between state militaries.17  
As further evidence that warfare is not confined to industrialized state-versus-state 
conflict. Two separate studies18 make a poignant alert to the value of ungoverned 
territories, and the complex threats they represent to global security and stability, as well 
as the inherently social phenomenon that creates the ungoverned space. The conventional 
paradigm has no model for intervention in truly ungoverned spaces. It is the remoteness, 
disconnectedness and rustic nature of the actors involved that makes ungoverned spaces–
and all low-tech artifacts of irregular warfare–that makes these conventional 
disadvantages into advantages for irregular threats. This is not because our irregular 
enemies deliberately choose something other than massive mechanized formations 
capable of crushing less-formidable mechanized formations through fire and maneuver 
across the open physical terrain—any insurgent group would be happy to have an 
armored brigade or two. It is because they inherently possess distinct disadvantages in the 
material or physical domain (i.e., widespread application of advanced technologies, 
firepower and mass logistics) and equally strong natural advantages in the social domain. 
This dramatically impacts their ability to maneuver through the human terrain and bring 
about consequences tied to their advantages in ways that are invisible to us or beyond 
effective response by our current methods. In wars amongst the people, our enemies are 
not able to best our combat forces, so they must negate that force in order to survive; thus 
they seek to dominate in the information domain.   
Arguably, in our technological development over the last 30 years, we have 
actually prepared for the information war: constructing control-centric technologies and 
improved firepower, but not improving our understanding. Notions of net-centric warfare 
 5 
have dominated the Pentagon’s thinking and have driven us to invest massive intellectual 
and financial capital in information-technology applications for speeding up our own 
information flow or empowering the edges of our organizations.19 No such deliberate 
effort or investment has been expended by our enemies; the insurgent’s use of networks 
is organic, natural. It is in our self-analytical, high-tech collection and dissemination 
systems that the environmental information asymmetry defeats us: we are technologically 
and intellectually equipped to defeat a foe organized, equipped and trained like us. In 
conflict with dark networks throughout the human terrain we are, in a sense, blinded and 
trapped by the very systems which we created.   
The obvious response, then, may at first seem simpler than it is. We need better 
technology and better methods. So which comes first?  Many distinguished authors have 
debated as to whether it is technological change or doctrinal change which drives the 
other20 and that our lack of control over our technical and doctrinal destiny, as it were, 
may be indicative of the unpredictable and emergent nature of warfare in the increasingly 
complex world in which we live.21  While that debate continues, the strategic and tactical 
patterns of the wars we face continue to evolve quicker than our ability to understand, 
organize and intervene appropriately both strategically and tactically. There is always 
room for better technology, assuming better means more useful to the operator in 
increasing his awareness, efficiency and capabilities. This thesis takes a hard look at the 
use of SNA to analyze complex social environments and develop intervention strategies 
appropriate for warfare against dark networks. 
The fundamental concepts for this thesis and network warfare find their roots in 
complexity theory and social network theory, which introduce new concepts and terms 
such as nodes and links, embeddedness and centrality, core-periphery, Simmelian ties, 
trust and reciprocity, structural holes and brokerage. Theories such as complexity theory 
and others provide the concepts of non-linearity, dynamic and emergent structures, trust, 
embeddedness, brokerage and the interdependent nature of position and power, 
culminating in the concept of the key player. System complexity is defined as outputs 
being disproportional to inputs, the whole not being equal to the sum or the parts, and 
inconsistencies in the relationship between causes and effects. As applied to network 
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warfare, or netwar,22 these concepts possess several key aspects which must be 
understood.23  Non-linearity and embeddedness are both rooted in the fundamental nature 
of social networks. The dichotomy between organic (naturally occurring), scale-free and 
random networks can be described as how complexity and embeddedness arise in social 
networks.   
Randomly distributed networks exhibit normally-distributed levels of connectivity 
between members across a given network; none are substantially more or less connected 
that anyone else. Most real-world networks do not exhibit random connectivity; social 
networks are interconnected according power law distribution. The random network 
exhibits a normal distribution of relations while the scale-free exhibits a power law 
distribution of relations where only a few nodes possess a very large number of relations, 
indicating the presence of key players. One way to describe it is that an actor, because of 
the scale-free nature of his networked social environment in which he is embedded, can 
have a disproportionately high number of relations in multiple layers of networks, as in 
Figure 1.24  His social network neighbors, again because of the scale-free structure 
around them, will almost certainly not possess the same number, type or strength of ties 
with their neighbors. They may not even feel the same way about the first actor as he 
does about them, and, furthermore, those feelings may change over time; hence, they 
possess asymmetric and dynamic quantities and qualities of relations.   
 
Figure 1. Comparison of random distribution (left) and scale-free distribution (right) 
of relationships in a social network. From Barabasi and Bonabeau, 2003. 
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In a manner that follows from uneven relations amongst actors, enters the non-
linear nature of complexity. Some actors are better-connected than others in some 
circumstances, and even the term “better” means different things in different contexts. 
Varying degrees of connectedness, trust, similarity, knowledge and awareness, access to 
resources and other factors all contribute depending upon the context under investigation. 
Some actors will be better positioned in terms of information awareness, and those actors 
will have power over others because of who they know, who those relations know, and 
the social distance between them. In practical terms, this means that information will 
flow unevenly across a social network and that different actors will respond differently, 
depending upon the information they receive and how they interpret it. Since actors are 
interdependent on multiple levels, or embedded in multiple networks, there are at least as 
many ways to reach an actor as there are relations embedded in the social network. The 
illicit nature of dark networks makes these relations even more tenuous, precious yet 
vulnerable, and demands secrecy and trust between one another. 
For purposes of this thesis, the primary aspect of complexity is that complex 
systems cannot be understood by simply disaggregating and isolating the parts for 
scrutiny.25  In terms of total network analysis, simply taking a network apart and studying 
the actors or even studying actor dyads (A’s relationship with B) is not going be 
meaningful. The actors must be understood in their network context. The corollary is that 
a social network cannot be understood apart from its environmental context.26  For social 
networks, this means that a network must be understood by the relations between actors 
and across the network boundaries within its surrounding social networks. The synergy 
between the components of the network and the network and its environment must be 
considered. A second, equally-important factor is the covert nature of dark networks. The 
critical difference between dark networks and light, or overt, networks, is that the actors, 
individually and collectively, take actions to conceal relationships, intentions and 
activities. These characteristics of dark networks exacerbate some inherent SNA planning 
problems which will be discussed later.* 
                                                 
* See Chapter 3 for discussion of the three basic planning assumptions for social network analysis. 
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Embeddedness is a critical aspect of complex systems and, therefore, of netwar.27  
Embeddedness rests upon the foundation that multiple networks or systems in society 
exist simultaneously and that individual actors and groups are present and act in more 
than one layer simultaneously.28  What is significant in this multi-layered existence is that 
actors accomplish their goals through trusted relations regardless of the layer in which 
they predominantly exist or interact.29  Actors tend to give preference to trusted and 
capable persons and groups who possess information or have known connections to 
resources rather than to other, unknown and un-trusted actors who may or may not have 
access to the same information or resources.30  This holds true for actors within 
organizations, which contain social networks inside themselves: if the organization’s 
social network reach does not support an actor’s goals, then the actor may reach outside 
of the organization via extra-organizational ties to accomplish those goals.31  Therein lies 
a critical vulnerability that may be exploited by another group, such as a counterterrorism 
or counterinsurgent force and has pertinence to this thesis. 
As applied to social networks, the concepts of embeddedness and centrality make 
a useable theoretical frame in which to identify and discover paths to key players, critical 
mechanisms, and other exploitable locations or qualities in a network. It is from this 
position that this thesis departs to describe how combining SNA and the SF Target 
Analysis process will improve the way in which the military does business in wars 
amongst the people. 
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C. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
 
Figure 2. Thesis structure. 
This thesis follows the structure depicted in Figure 2. The following chapters 
begin with a review of existing literature, highlighting a gap between current U.S. 
military thought and practice and the complexity of wars amongst the people. Chapters 
III and IV describe the frames and structure of the Special Forces Target Analysis process 
and Social Network Analysis, respectively, to build the abutments, so to speak, for the 
bridging concept of the hybrid method, which constitutes Chapter V. Chapter VI is the 
analytical chapter centered on an open-source dataset of a real-world terrorist network as 
investigated and published by the International Crisis Group. The last chapter is the 
conclusions drawn from the application of the hybrid method to the dataset, and 
continues to recommend future work and possible policy implications for the military, in 
particular the special operations community, for future forays into wars amongst the 
people. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW:  A SURVEY OF THEORETICAL 
AND APPLICATION LITERATURE 
 
This literature review surveys the field of relevant research and analysis in 
military and academic components. The military component in general demonstrates how 
far military doctrine has come in understanding irregular warfare, but also how it lags 
behind the state of the art in understanding complexity as applied to systems and social 
network thinking. These military works cover planning, operations, intelligence, targeting 
and effects-based operations. The academic component captures the non-military 
approach to social networks, criminal networks, secret societies (including criminal, 
insurgent and terror organizations) and what social network analysis, or SNA, has to offer 
for theoretical and practical support for operationalizing complex analysis and 
intervention strategies. Included in this review are the works that established or derived 
the fundamental concepts that support SNA, describe dark networks, a basic level of 
understanding secret societies and its sociological implications, and military planning in 
general and as applied to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. This survey is not 
intended to be exhaustive, but illustrative of the current state of relevant concepts. 
A. AMERICAN MILITARY LITERATURE AND DOCTRINAL 
PUBLICATIONS 
The military literature component is drawn primarily from the Army’s field 
manuals, including the Army’s doctrine and implementation publications; the joint, or 
inter-service, intelligence and operations publications; and Special Operations 
publications.32  All of these documents have been published since 2001.33  The academic 
component comes mainly from the field of social network analysis, but also from the 
fields of social movement theory, econometrics, secret societies and organized crime. The 
documents for this component go back to 1908. 
The root assumptions behind the Special Operations Targeting Process (SOTP), 
specifically the Special Forces Target Analysis process, hereafter referred to as “SF target 
analysis,” and SNA stem from a common frame which provides a critical theoretical 
bridge between the two processes. The SF Target Analysis process and SNA see the 
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world as a system of systems or a network of networks, respectively, which are 
compatible views of the world. Traditionally, SF Target Analysis views the levels of 
interconnectedness between systems within systems mainly as hierarchical and contained 
within the larger system–vertical interdependence –but not necessarily as interdependent 
horizontally across peer systems within the environment except at the highest level.34  
For the purposes of this thesis, however, a useful comparison can be made using the 
concept of vertical and horizontal interconnectedness of the conflict environment used in 
center of gravity analysis. With one critical exception, most of the joint publications 
describe de facto embeddedness, but never fully articulate the resulting dynamics at work 
other than stating that actors, influences and intervention effects are interconnected.35   
The inherent social network characteristic known as embeddedness means that 
networks exist within and amongst other networks, such that the networks and the 
transactions within and between them are inseparable from one another.36   While not 
exactly identical, the fact that both of these analytical processes have a principal notion of 
interconnectedness and interdependency means that most, if not all, other aspects of the 
processes could have strong levels of equality or, at least, should not be completely 
foreign to each other.   
However, it is not in this similarity that SNA offers advantage to the user as the 
similarity is just a bridge connecting the two processes’ base concepts. It is in the 
differences between the two that SNA offers its advantages. The difference is rooted in 
the framing and application of complexity in the approaches. As such, the disadvantage 
of the traditional application of systems thinking is the linearity of the methods described 
in various publications. That is, the analytical and intervention planning methods were 
not formed around complexity thinking. The advantages to SNA are embodied by 
complexity thinking as detailed earlier in this chapter. This is manifest in the ability of 
SNA to detect and evaluate patterns of relationships and attributes of a network as a 
whole, providing insight into the structure and distribution of power (or, access and 
placement) across that network. These patterns come from the measurements of centrality 
and other measurements available only through SNA. Despite this stark difference, traces 
of common theoretical lineage are not found only between SNA and the SOTP. In fact, 
 13 
there is a closer fit as we elevate our level of analysis to the strategic level, but it still falls 
short of fully implementing network thinking into our modern targeting methodology.  
The concept of identifying centers of gravity, or COGs, as portrayed in JP 3-0 and 
JP 5–037 and to a certain extent in FM 3-05,38 essentially describes embeddedness of 
multiple actors and influences at the strategic level. However, the authors of JP 3-0 and 
JP 5-0 only make use of link analysis which is dyadic in its level of analysis (A is 
connected to B and B is connected to C, etc.) and does not lend itself to discovering what 
the entire network looks like or how it is constructed, let alone measuring power 
distribution across the network. As a second flaw in the joint publications, upon seeking a 
framework for development of a consistent implementation strategy, the military authors 
fall back into a linear paradigm with the Lines of Operation method of implementation. 
JP 3-60 Joint Targeting does initially portray targets as a system of component systems. 
To its credit, it does not utilize the Lines of Operation implementation methodology but, 
rather, it uses an even more linear discrete cyclical process of one cycle per target without 
regard for fractal effects of the success or failure of that one cycle. However, to its 
discredit, JP 3-60 does not allow for making cycles contingent upon the effects gained (or 
lost) from targeting cycle to targeting cycle. In most military models of intelligence and 
operational cycles, they are treated as discrete events, not modified or otherwise adapted 
from one iteration to the next. Nor does it allow for anything inching closer to 
acknowledging potential target complexity: horizontal interdependence across systems, 
sub-systems and components. Overall, measures of effectiveness do not create an 
analytical framework capable of detecting or measuring fractal effects of targeting cycles. 
The authors of JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 and, most of all, JP 3-60 begin down the trail of 
complexity, systems and embeddedness, but then jump back onto the track of traditional, 
linear intervention systems approaches when proscribing interventions and assessing 
changes. Thus, the U.S. military institutionally stops itself short of implementing 
complexity principles or a systems view in its operational- and tactical-level analysis and 
operations and limits its analytical processes to static link analysis, leaving the 
operational and tactical levels without a useful, modern planning framework at all. 
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Within the special operations publications, an interesting dichotomy arises. There 
is a curious gap is between the rather meticulous deconstructionist approach of the SF 
Target Analysis process, known by the acronym CARVER, and the fact that the rest of 
the publications concerning Unconventional Warfare, Operational Preparation of the 
Environment, and Foreign Internal Defense make no detailed explanation of the 
advantages of understanding networked insurgent groups or other social systems. All 
three exclusively concerned with irregular conflict. A comprehensive analysis of the 
etymology of the SOTP and CARVER methodologies reveals a disparity between the 
Army SOF doctrine as written in FM 3-05 and that as written in FM 3-05.20 Special 
Forces Intelligence Operations and the joint SOF doctrine embodied in JP 3-05.2. The 
disparity at issue arises in the authors’ complete lack of conceptualization of systems 
thinking in military operations. The Army SOF manual has a much more comprehensive 
complexity-minded approach to assessing and evaluating targets not merely as technical 
systems to be reduced to their parts, but as a framework for disaggregating a complex 
socio-political structure of a conflict while maintaining the interdependent nature of the 
environment. The Army SOF manual draws this particular lineage from the previously-
discussed strategic joint manuals JP 3-039 and JP 5–040 but with some detracting issues. 
Another strategic variation exists in JP 3-60 Joint Targeting, but suffers from the same 
root issues as the former manuals: a bias toward linear, kinetic intervention. As such, FM 
3-05, JP 3-0, JP 3-60 and JP 5-0 incorporate a broader application of complexity concepts 
than does the Joint Special Operations publication JP 3-05.2.   
An important inconsistency arises in these publications, but most vividly within 
JP 3-60. Its bias toward kinetic targeting undoes its progressive thinking in analysis by 
linearizing the intervention approach; that is, it would have the U.S. military attack a 
target as if the target were a unitary actor, rather than a system of systems with 
vulnerabilities distributed throughout the environment as the manual states. In this way, 
targeting practitioners using this doctrine, while they may have properly framed the 
environment, are limited from many intervention options and maximizing and measuring 
the effects of those intervention methods as is so strongly stated by these publications. It 
is this author’s belief that this is because the assessment process is not supported by a 
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methodology capable of framing or measuring such complex environments. And with no 
way to thoroughly measure the initial conditions, how is measurement of changes due to 
intervention strategies possible?  It is not, except by anecdote or perhaps keen intuition of 
the aggregate. In sum, readers of JP 3-0, JP 3-60, JP 5-0 and FM 3-05 would come away 
with an understanding of strategic-level interdependence (mostly as it pertains to center 
of gravity analysis; see Figure 3) and those of JP 3-05.2 and FM 3-05.20 only would be 
relatively unprepared for the theoretical leap from link analysis to SNA but would still 
have a basic understanding of interconnectedness between layers of systems. 
 
Figure 3. Joint doctrinal graphic from that uses the PMESII framework to 
demonstrate the interconnectedness—embeddedness—of the operational environment 
and alluding to a systems method of analysis. From JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, 
2011. 
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In a significant departure from the trend described above, two of the latest Army 
manuals, FM 3-05.201 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency,41 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500,42 and a Joint Warfighting Center 
handbook43  make substantially more use of complexity or systems thinking in their 
descriptions of the conflict environment and interdependence of actors contained within. 
However, while both of the first two manuals spend a good amount of time telling the 
reader to perceive the environment as complex, neither provides a framework for analysis 
of the social and political aspects of the environment or conflict. This lack of analytical 
framework leaves the military wanting for a structure in which to couch any intervention 
strategies, let alone a system of metrics to assist in constructing a strategy or being able to 
determine the outcomes of intervention. In this regard, both of these manuals cease 
injecting complexity into analysis and operations at the same point as the joint targeting 
publication (JP 3-60), though they continue stressing complexity of intervention in 
irregular warfare environments.   
The counterinsurgency manual possesses an appendix on social network analysis, 
but it erroneously portrays centrality measurements as something that tactical units can 
conduct as they are currently structured and trained. FM 3-24 also implies that the 
information gleaned from SNA can be boiled down to over-simplified matrix-style charts 
for distribution to subordinate units. While it looks appealing in its simplicity, the 
methods disintegrate when dealing with larger datasets in the real world. The use of SNA 
software packages is mentioned nowhere, so unit commanders and officers attempting to 
direct their soldiers and analysts to determine high value individuals are left without a 
paddle, so to speak, as resort to intuition. Overall, while it does not do the military a great 
deal of help in framing and understanding complex interdependence, the current 
counterinsurgency manual goes the furthest in implementing SNA for understanding the 
environment as well as identifying key players as contained within. 
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Figure 4. A first military description of a strategic-level system of systems 
perspective. From JWC’s Effects-based Approach to Joint Operations handbook.44  
However, the Joint Warfighting Center’s Commander’s Handbook for Effects-
Based Approach to Joint Operations is a light in the dark, compared to the rest of the 
military literature in its attempt at instilling a systems perspective in military planning 
and operations. This document went very far in its analysis and application of systems 
thought as it viewed the world of warfare as a system of systems (Figure 4). It did not 
stop there, as it also goes on to describe the depth and importance of key nodes and some 
description of embeddedness, though it did not refer to it as such.45  Unfortunately, in one 
of its last years in operation, GEN James Mattis, USMC, dismantled U.S. Joint Forces 
Command’s EBO school of thought.46  Ironically, Defense Secretary Robert Gates soon 
afterward announced the command would be shut down.47 
The next problem identified is that of assessment and evaluation of the 
environment and changes due to intervention and other factors. Said another way, how to 
measure initial conditions and changes in the conflict environment to indicate patterns, 
trends and trajectories of the myriad of factors in modern conflict environments. While 
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several military publications make mention of the need for appropriate metrics and may 
or may not give boundaries to the usable conceptual space for those metrics, none go as 
far as TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500,48  JP 3-60,49 or the Joint Warfighting Center’s 
Commander’s Handbook for Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations. Yet, even 
these publications do not offer a systemic framework for measuring a consistent type of 
information throughout all levels of analysis and to every conflict and across the 
operational spectrum: characteristics of the relationships between actors and of 
relationships across networks embedded within the conflict environment before, during 
and after intervention. The concept is applied at the strategic and campaign level and 
without word of its applicability at lower levels or how to implement it. In sociological 
terms, there is ample space in these last two publications for proposing SNA as an 
effective method for understanding the environment, but none whatsoever for using it to 
assist prescribing an intervention strategy or guiding the future analysis of changes in the 
environment post-intervention. They both, however, open the reader’s mind to 
understanding a fractal spread of effects across an area of military operations, which is 
certainly a step in the right direction. 
This brief review of joint military, U.S. Army conventional and special operations 
doctrine reveals inconsistent and incomplete use of complexity and systems thinking to 
frame and describe analysis and planning in complex environments, though all 
publications make mention of the increasingly complex nature of the operating 
environment. For a brief overview assessment of the applicable publications, see Table 1. 
Next, a review of civilian academic SNA literature is necessary to determine what this 
field offers to bolster the military’s analytical and targeting processes in modern conflict. 
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Table 1. An assessment of joint military, Army and Special Operations Forces 
publications’ use of complexity and systems thinking to assist in analysis and strategy 
development. 
B. CIVILIAN ACADEMIC LITERATURE. 
For the application of SNA to social science problems—such as dark networks—
there has been an explosion of literature describing the emergence of complexity and 
interdependence of actors and their activities in society. Works from Barabasi,50 
Holland,51 Lewin,52 and Waldrop53 established a pattern of literature looking at the 
aspects of complexity and interconnectedness in the modern world—specifically modern 
societies interconnected by the Internet and other artifacts of the information age. It is 
interesting to note that many of the authors did not have sociology backgrounds. Rather, 
they were physicists, biologists, businessmen and economists. As they applied this 
complexity thinking to larger social and physical phenomena, a top-down-oriented school 
of thought began to form. This grew to include international and military affairs.   
The Pentagon’s Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) created an 
environment where James Moffat’s,54 Edward Smith’s55 and Albert, Garstka and 
Stein’s56 works came to encompass the leading-edge thought on network-centric warfare 
in an effort to morph American military doctrine to pattern itself after natural complex 
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adaptive systems which demonstrate characteristics that allow those systems to adjust to 
threats and changes in the local environment in the name of survival. Despite the research 
and prescriptions offered by these and other authors spurred by Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s desire for a leaner, more high-tech, “information-age”57 force, this desired 
outcome has yet to be realized. 
Prior to Secretary Rumsfeld’s time in office under President George W. Bush, 
however, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt had envisioned future conflicts not merely 
involving high-tech networks of armored vehicles and future-soldiers, but a social version 
of cyberwar, meaning decentralized power structures adapting to and taking advantage of 
pre-existing systems and influences in the environment: “These protagonists are likely to 
consist of dispersed organizations, small groups, and individuals who communicate, 
coordinate and conduct their campaigns in an interdependent manner, often without a 
precise central command.”58  Much more recently, Brafman and Beckstrom illustrated 
the social reality of these trends in their analysis of both legitimate and extralegal 
leaderless organizations.59  Their work indicated what had been brewing in the sociology 
world for some time: that social adaptation will breed complexity. 
While the top-down thought approach described above is relatively young, social 
scientists had been looking at all things interconnected from the bottom-up for decades. 
For example, a seminal paper used in this research by Mark Granovetter entitled “The 
Strength of Weak Ties” was published in 1973.60  However, the basis for SNA 
application does not originate solely in the quantitative sociology and SNA literature.   
The studies of history, international terrorism policy, criminology social and 
revolutionary movements, and even healthcare offer a broad array of examples of 
theoretical and practical aspects of systems thinking in successful, unsuccessful and 
undetermined conflict outcomes from various types of belligerents’ perspectives. I draw 
upon all these sectors of SNA-related literature for my thesis. Spanning decades, 
fundamental SNA publications by Wasserman and Faust,61  Simmel,62 Burt,63 Freeman,64 
Hanneman and Riddle,65 DeNooy et al., Borgatti,66  and Scott67 are the basis for much of 
the present day SNA procedures and research, including this work. More than a century 
ago, Simmel applied the fundamental concepts to the phenomenon of secret societies, 
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noting fundamental differences that secrecy demands. Wasserman and Faust, Hanneman 
and Riddle, and Freeman compiled the basic concepts and processes behind SNA. Scott’s 
handbook brings the Burt’s analysis of economic competition changed the way in which 
we look at competition between people and in the commercial marketplace. Borgatti and 
Freeman created UCINET, a landmark piece of SNA software originally developed in the 
1980s.68  DeNooy et al., created a SNA program called Pajek, which has some 
operational advantages over UCINET. A next step in approaching the analysis of 
networked organizations problem is covered by Kilduff and Tsai69 and Monge and 
Contractor,70 expanding on the previous authors’ work and approached SNA application 
from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Krebs71 analyzed the 9/11 terrorists’ connections 
using SNA, bringing it to higher level of popular attention. For purposes of this thesis, all 
of the measures of centrality and indicators of characteristics of social networks, as well 
as multi-disciplinary applications, are contained in these authors’ collective work. 
Other pieces that strongly influenced this thesis are immediately concerned with a 
subset of social networks called dark networks.   Originally considered by Georg Simmel 
in his work on secret societies,72 the idea of analyzing intentionally-concealed social 
constructs grew as others (Hazelrigg73 and Erickson,74 for example) re-examined his 
ideas and combined them with developments in the field. The idea of dark or covert 
networks—including insurgent and criminal organizations—has been of interest for some 
time and inspired authors like Sparrow,75 Klerks,76 and Reed.77  Sparrow and Klerks 
looked at criminal organizations and Reed analyzed the insurgency in Iraq as a SNA 
problem. In fact, Sparrow’s basic assumptions for analysis of dark networks are critical 
and hint of a quantitative science intertwined with analytical art. One of the landmark 
works on the subject came from industry, by Baker and Faulkner, extending the idea that 
dark networks can arise from light, or visible, inter- and intra-organizational relations.78 
Interest in the subject exploded with the advent of international terrorism and, in 
particular, the attacks of September 11, 2001. The idea of dark networks has since been 
elaborated by Raab and Milward,79 who coined the term and approached the issue from a 
policy problem perspective; and Rodrigues,80 who proposed that the superb security and 
secrecy of the Atocha, Spain train bombers (the “3–11” attacks in 2004) was in the 
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weakness of the ties between them; his analysis builds on another aspect of Granovetter’s 
“Strength of Weak Ties” in that those distant relations make them difficult to discover 
and disrupt. Valdis Krebs gave the 9–11 hijackers a thorough analysis using his In-flow 
software.81  Finally, Stuart Koschade, in his analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah,82 
demonstrated that SNA of covert groups is possible, albeit postmortem, and can bring 
about useful information about such groups’ structure and internal dynamics. This 
analysis of JI as a dark network dove-tails neatly into this thesis, as JI played a significant 
role in Noordin Mohammed Top’s network, which is the subject of analysis in Chapter 6. 
Agent-based modeling computer modeling has been used to study dark networks, 
both from a pure research perspective83 as well as a test bed for intervention techniques.84 
Here, Kathleen Carley, with Maksim Tsvetovat and others, has been relatively prolific in 
publishing her findings using her PCANSS dynamic network modeling schema.85  Carley 
has not been the only one to advance intervention strategies. Nagaraja and Anderson86 
proposed a limited but interesting set of naïve offensive and defensive strategies in virtual 
simulations, which give insight into possible fundamental strategies to be adjusted for 
real-world application. Some of the ideas behind Carley’s and others’ attention to 
network dynamics and intervention strategies include understanding the impact of an 
actor’s position in their network, partly as measured by their centrality. 
Enter the concept of the key player, who derives his importance from their 
position for either diffusing information into and across a network, or vis-à-vis their 
removal and the subsequent fracturing effects upon that network. A key player’s power is 
derived in part from his centrality. This concept owes much to the work of Stephen 
Borgatti87 who, among a great many other aspects, looked at specifically identifying key 
players in a networked environment. In an older article, Phillip Bonacich88 has developed 
a method to analyze overlapping memberships, which is important for accounting for 
actor embeddedness and the idea of exploiting multiple pathways to reach a targeted 
actor. He also explored the eigenvector centrality89 which gives us centrality 
measurements of actors by the quantity of their network neighbors’ contacts—the 
quintessential “knowing people who know people.”  Additional measures of centrality 
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attempting to better refine the key player problem of network intervention targeting, are 
described in pieces by Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou.90 
As a military practitioners go, one of the first to capitalize on the work being done 
at Naval Postgraduate School, John Dodson drew a linkage between dark networks, small 
world phenomena, and “nexus” topography under the concept of man-hunting.91  Also, 
Brian Reed authored an article on SNA and Insurgency92 and co-authored the SNA 
appendix in the Army and Marine Corps’ new counterinsurgency manual; and Jonathan 
Hammill focused on simultaneous analysis of layers of networks in intervening against 
near-term terrorist attacks.93  As testament to the new way of thinking as applied once in 
Iraq, the military’s capture of Saddam Hussein has been documented as a success of 
implementing aspects of SNA.94   For attacks on distributed networks, an important 
branch of investigation is into recovery from attack. Here, again, Carley used her 
dynamic modeling simulations to determine that cells within dark networks are able to 
overcome simple attacks (removal of single or few key nodes) by reconnecting via latent 
relations outside the clique or cell.95   
Specific to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Improvised 
Explosive Device, or IED, as a social phenomenon was the subject of study by 
Montgomery McFate96 and the term “viral” first appeared in the military-oriented 
literature in a work by Scott Swanson97 that described a following-the-links approach to 
targeting of IED cell members and supply chains. Another important aspect of 
maintaining a dark network is contained within the struggle between efficiency and 
security, which was analyzed by Bienenstock and Bonacich.98,99  A last note on new 
directions for the study of dark networks and their capabilities comes from work by 
Simson Garfinkel,100 Marc Sageman,101 Brafman and Beckstrom,102 and Amoss,103 who 
was an army officer concerned about American military and governmental continuity 
after a Soviet invasion in the 1960s. He was cited by the American white-supremacist and 
secessionist Louis Beam, who looked at leaderless networks and their ability to overcome 
traditional direct-attack intervention methods as a form of resistance to federal invasion 
into citizens’ rights. Overall, these authors analyzed and appreciated the phenomenon of 
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so-called “leaderless” networks, or those whose deliberate, decentralized structures 
precludes disruption by centrality-based node removal. 
From this survey of the relevant military and academic literature and their 
associated theories, it is evident that the time is right for military thought and doctrine to 
encompass complexity in conflict environment analysis and development of intervention 
strategies. While this thesis deals with a fairly specific set of measurements and 
processes, the larger field of social network analysis has much more to offer the military 
and, more specifically, Special Operations, which was created for ambiguous and 
complex conflict environments. The effectiveness of the analysis and intervention 
strategies outlined in the following chapters is only a small set of examples of what is 
possible with SNA.  
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III INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
TARGETING PROCESS 
 
The Special Operations Targeting Process, or SOTP, is intended to support 
American military strategy provided by a strategic-level command through multiple 
echelons and a coherent series of tactical actions intended to have effects greater than the 
sum of the actions themselves. This chapter describes the three layers—or echelons—of 
targeting, the way the SOTP supports conventional targeting, and target evaluation, 
selection and prioritization methods.*  By the end of this chapter, the reader should 
understand the SOTP process and the CARVER† method of target evaluation. 
In pursuing American foreign or defense policy at the strategic level, problems or 
problem sets can be framed according to geographic regions, which supports the Defense 
Department’s geographic orientation of the Geographic Combatant Commands, or 
GCCs.104 If a defense problem is defined as global or specific to an assigned function of 
another command, such as international terrorism conducted by al-Qaeda and its 
associated networks and ideology,105 then another Unified Command with global or 
appropriate functional responsibilities, such as USSOCOM,106 takes overall responsibility 
for properly framing the problem and deriving the ends, ways and means to resolve the 
national security problem and its contributing causes.107 In either case, a strategic-level 
command will frame defense problems and threats as strategic problems. 
At the strategic level, all wartime and non-wartime campaigns are top-down 
directed by national security decisions through the Pentagon and include a special 
operations component. Employment of SOF in a non-wartime environment has always 
been a tricky issue,108 but this is what most special operators were accustomed to prior to 
9/11 and what was taught at the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, NC.109  Once a 
Congressional or Executive Branch directive and authority  was established for given 
                                                 
* Specific tactics, techniques and procedures of reconnaissance and surveillance, asset recruitment, 
assaulting an objective area, and exploitation of captured human and technical targets will not be discussed.  
This chapter provides an overview of analytical and planning processes leading up to and following an 
actual assault or other operation. 
† CARVER is a military targeting mnemonic meaning Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Effect, 
and Recognizability, and is explained in detail later in this chapter. 
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security issue, the Geographic Combatant Command’s planning and targeting began, with 
SOF involvement at the TSOC level and then directs further SOF involvement 
descending to the tactical level. Figure 5 depicts the strategic to tactical levels of war and 
corresponding organizations pertinent to this thesis. 
 
Figure 5. Echelons of the chain of command, the associated the levels of war and 
levels of target analysis.110  
SOF targeting has traditionally been a Theater Special Operations Command, or 
TSOC, function subordinate to the GCC and, when applicable, supporting a Joint Force 
Command’s (JFC) targeting process. Intelligence collection and analysis occurs at 
multiple layers beneath those echelons, dominated by human intelligence, or HUMINT, 
and signals intelligence, or SIGINT, and each of the task forces may conduct their own 
intelligence collection and operations, but traditional operations were predominantly 
directed by a higher headquarters such as a GCC or JFC. SOF’s own operational and 
tactical target development was limited to local reconnaissance preceding a raid. Thus, in 
the traditional instance, the SOTP occurs by direction of the supported GCC or JFC as a 
product of its own targeting process.   
The other instance is when a JFC that is operating within a GCC’s Area of 
Responsibility requests support from the GCC, or from the assigned Joint Force Special 
Operations Component Command, or JFSOCC, in the form of a target or target set* 
which meet the criteria for SOF employment. In the military doctrine literature, this is the 
                                                 
* A target set is a group of targets related by geographic proximity, patterns of membership, 
communications or other associations. 
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bottom-up fashion—obviously as viewed from the GCC’s perspective. Neither of these 
models, however, addresses the internal operating environment within SOF, particularly 
within a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), or a subordinate Special 
Operations Task Force (SOTF), where bottom-up targeting from the tactical level is the 
norm. 
Since 9/11, targeting has also become a USSOCOM function as a product of the 
GWOT synchronizing task as directed by the Secretary of Defense.111  Today, there are 
instances where target analysis and subsequent operations of this kind are conducted in a 
bifurcated manner, with a GCC and USSOCOM formulating strategies and directing 
supporting operations to the Joint Force Special Operations Component Command 
(JFSOCC). Additionally, during the wars in Iraq (2003–2011) and Afghanistan (2001-?) 
and other places, SOF played a leading role in targeting insurgent leadership and 
underground infrastructure.112  Meanwhile, special operations task forces constantly 
collect information to feed the intelligence cycle, conduct intelligence analysis of their 
own, and conduct derived or directed missions in support of a JFC or TSOC strategy and 
intent.  
The GCC identifies the strategic-level systems of interest, such as a network of 
relations between physical geography, socio-cultural groups, political entities, 
technology, religions and external relations using the PMESII framework.*  The GCC 
then frames the intervention strategy to inform the ends, ways and means planning 
methodology along the lines of that framework. Thus, the strategic level of analysis is 
established. Then the resource requirements and lower levels of analysis can be defined 
and bounded. The military’s actions at the operational and tactical levels of war follow 
directly from the strategic analysis that includes defining the strategic goals, limitations 
and boundaries of action and the mission and intent† of the GCC for a subordinate Joint 
Force Command, or JFC. That subordinate command then operationalizes the higher 
                                                 
* See Figures 3 and 4 in Chapter II, PMESII is a framework for describing the interrelated elements of 
a society in conflict: Political, Military, Economic, Security, Information and Intelligence. 
† The commander’s intent is an explicit statement of the purpose of the operation, the desired end state 
and definitions of acceptable and unacceptable levels of types of risk. 
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headquarters’ strategic goals, mission and commander’s intent for action. It then directs 
tactical units to fulfill mission objectives113 
 The SOTP delineates types of targets according to the effects of 
intervention against the enemy. Strategic targets are those which successful intervention 
would contribute to the GCC’s strategic objectives. Successful intervention against 
operational targets means that the supported JFC commander’s operational plans are 
positively influenced. Tactical targets normally do not meet SOF mission criteria114 
(particularly in support of a conventional force) but may become important in developing 
the skills of a host nation’s military or police forces against a common enemy.115 
The SOTP, which is a SOF-specific subset of the conventional military Joint 
Targeting Process, uses a fusion of operations and intelligence functions to efficiently 
and holistically attack a system of systems from a position of widespread understanding 
of the structure of and relations between potential military targets. Such potential targets 
within a foreign country come in two categories: physical, such as communications 
systems, transportation infrastructure, or electrical power grid networks; and human, such 
as the social networks of terrorists, insurgents, political parties, industries, or tribes.   
The SOTP frames the overall target systems as interlocking sub-systems, 
complexes and components which are also intended as levels of analysis. These levels of 
analysis can be framed as parallel to levels of war; that is, the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels. Echelons of the military chain of command also correspond to the levels 
of war, and have specific responsibilities for the different levels of target analysis in 
support of an overall theater strategic campaign. The theory behind pairing the levels of  
analysis of the target system with the levels of war is that the planning goals and 
limitations at each echelon vary enough that the levels of analysis appropriate to 
understand and achieve those goals must also vary.   
While this model of the levels of war exists to delineate levels of analysis and 
bureaucratic responsibilities, this thesis deals with the technical analytical and operational 
aspects and not the administrative or logistical aspects contained within each level. It is 
important to understand the separation of responsibilities per each echelon to see how it 
compares to the networked threats we face, as well as how the SOF targeting process is 
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different from the conventional process. See Figure BBB for one example of a theater 
SOF chain of command from USSOCOM to a SOTF.  
The U.S. military defines the levels of war as strategic, operational and tactical: 
Strategic: “In the context of military operations, strategy develops an idea or set 
of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and 
integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” 
 
Operational: “The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to 
national and military strategic objectives.” 
 
 Tactical: “Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in 
relation to each other. Joint doctrine focuses this term on planning and executing battles, 
engagements, and activities at the tactical level to achieve military objectives assigned to 
tactical units or task forces.”116 
 
The strategic level of war is where the national military strategies are converted 
into theater or country-specific campaign plans. The ends, ways and means of resolving a 
strategic problem is combined with strategic capabilities and resource constraints, and 
evaluated in terms of risk to provide the design space for a strategy. For special 
operations, USSOCOM and the GCCs develop global and regional strategic plans, which 
direct TSOCs and JFCs to plan operations (including tasking subordinate units with 
missions supporting the operation). Those tactical units conduct their assigned missions 
and provide intelligence feedback into the operational and strategic echelons. These JFCs 
and TSOCs direct subordinate SOF elements in accordance with the task organization as 




Figure 6. An example of a theater SOF chain of command from USSOCOM to 
SOTF. The Army, Navy and Air Force components are not part of the special operations 
chain. The solid lines represent direct operational control of lower echelons; the dashed 
lines represent optional command relationships dependent upon mission requirements as 
directed by the GCC. 
Each level of war is dependent upon the others, or else a major portion of the 
problem goes ignored, misunderstood, or unrealized. And every strategy must be 
operationalized, which requires operational-level plans and enabling instruments, to 
affect tactical actions, thereby achieving success. As part of the planning process, all 
echelons of SOF are free to initiate their own targeting beginning with the strategic 
framework as detailed from the GCC, TSOC or USSOCOM. The conventional military 
does not do this; higher headquarters designates specific targets for action by tactical 
units. However, the freedom to develop and engage targets at all levels is crucial for SOF 
success in that it creates faster responses to changes or new information and rapid 
exploitation of enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities. This process is intelligence-
intensive and can require outside expertise in describing and evaluating technical or 
unusually complex targets.   
The strategic level of war is where the national military strategies are converted 
into theater or country-specific campaign plans. The ends, ways and means of resolving a 
strategic problem is combined with strategic capabilities and resource constraints, and 
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evaluated in terms of risk to provide the design space for a strategy. For special 
operations, USSOCOM and the GCCs develop global and regional strategic plans, which 
direct TSOCs and JFCs to plan operations (including tasking subordinate units with 
missions supporting the operation). Those tactical units conduct their assigned missions 
and provide intelligence feedback into the operational and strategic echelons.   
SOF targets are intended to be operational or strategic in value, so the 
corresponding value of targets must be understood at the tactical level, where the action 
takes place. If a target that a tactical SOF unit is supposed to action does not have value 
at the strategic levels—or least at the operational level—then it is likely that the target 
will be passed to the conventional military or, in peacetime, remain un-actioned. In this 
way, the level of analysis at each of the levels of war has deterministic effects upon 
implementation plans and actions. Figure 7 depicts the tactical organization of SOF—the 
SOTF, or Special Operations Task Force. 
 
 
Figure 7. An example of SF operations and intelligence organization within a 
SOTF.117 
For the military, the operational level is located between the strategic and tactical 
levels of war and is intended to be the domain in which commands and staffs design 
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plans for implementation of the strategic direction and intent issued by the GCC. 
Generally, it is at this level that the JSOTF interfaces with the TSOC to receive direction 
and guidance and translate that into direction and resources for the SOTFs and other 
subordinate SOF elements. Simultaneously, the JSOTF develops its own supporting 
framework to further enable it to meet the strategic-level requirements. In conducting its 
analysis, the JSOTF functions are supposed to bridge the information and resource 
requirements of the long-range strategic intent to the daily tactical activities. Its analysis 
informs the subordinate tactical SOTF headquarters of mission and information 
requirements. 
The tactical level of operations is where operators and practitioners employ their 
skills and interface with the environment, both requiring and creating space for strategic 
impact by tactical action. This is one of the primary areas where the differences between 
special operations and conventional forces become apparent: where conventional 
operations seek to establish standardized methods of reducing uncertainty and problem 
solving, special operations forces do not necessarily have that luxury. Because their 
operational units are so small, SOF must be intimately familiar with the local 
environment. In social network terms, they must know who the key players are the and 
relationships between them for any given problem, which places enormous demands 
upon their regional orientation, linguistic capabilities, and cultural awareness. 
Oftentimes, the first lesson is to accept that you are a guest in an alien culture, and you 
must remain perceived as respecting those norms and abiding by those constraints, 
whatever they may be. The conventional military paradigm for operations and tactics is 
routinized actions with immediate feedback, while the SOF paradigm is exactly the 
opposite.118   
SOF culture, structure and communications are focused downward, with an 
expectation of intense collaboration between tactical units. SOF approach each problem 
as unique and requiring a high level of awareness and acuity with a strong emphasis on 
understanding, inclusivity, creativity, legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders, and  an 
eye toward long-term consequences of actions and desired outcomes.119  See Figure 8 for 
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the tactical organization of theater SOF. These concepts form the basis for the special 
operations targeting at all levels of war.  
A. THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING PROCESS   
 
Figure 8. D3A and F3EAD combined. Conventional D3A is efficiently enhanced by 
tactical SOF elements simultaneously conducting F3EAD in a decentralized manner 
across an operational area (from FM 3–60 The Targeting Process, 2010). 
The actual process SOF uses to intervene against targets is actually a combination 
of the conventional targeting process, referred to by the acronym D3A,* and actions 
derived from the SOF culture of bottom-up, decentralized operations. These operations 
are characterized by consistent information-sharing with all relevant friendly stakeholders 
and continuous refinements to planning. Referred to by the acronym F3EAD,†  and as 
depicted in Figure 8, SOF conduct targeting within the conventional targeting process, 
particularly when a JFC exists in a given theater of operations. However, special 
operations commands mandate the fusion of operations planners and intelligence 
collection and analysis functions at all echelons from the JSOTF to the ODA. At the 
lowest levels—in the ODAs and AOBs—the same people who collect the information 
also analyze and disseminate the intelligence, and plan and execute the missions, then 
exploit any evidence or other information gained to inform their next targeting cycle. 
                                                 
* D3A is Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess.   
† F3EAD is Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate. 
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Figure 9. Comparative timelines for F3EAD and D3A processes in operations 
against a targeted high-value individual. 
The target analysis methodology is intended to determine military value, priority 
of intervention (as compared to other potential targets) and the weapons and equipment 
required to efficiently inflict the appropriate amount of damage or influence upon the 
enemy. Input data required for effective target analysis include the commander’s intent 
(i.e.: the commander’s desired outcome), any data pertaining to the target structure, 
design and operation and consequences of various levels of diminished target system 
capability; personnel and equipment available for the mission (particularly any 
specialized equipment or expertise required to deal with a specific target, especially if it 
is unusually technical or complex), and the potential reactions of the enemy and other 
populations to different levels of diminished system output.120 These factors are then 
used to create evaluation criteria to determine the relative merit of attacking or otherwise 
intervening against specific components or critical points of a targeted system.121 
B. THE CARVER ANALYSIS TOOL 
The actual method within the SOTP to evaluate and prioritize target systems at 
multiple levels is embodied in the acronym CARVER. The components of the process 
are: criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect and recognizability.122 
Taken collectively, these components are meant to holistically evaluate the target system 
and the environment into which the target system is integrated. This method can be used 
at all three levels of war.123  The analyst makes value distinctions based upon the 
commander’s desired outcome in his stated intent. These values then become the 
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measuring sticks which define not only the desired effects, but also the opportunities and 
constraints, indeed the lens, with which the operator-analyst disaggregates and assesses 
the structure of the target system. From this assessment comes the derivation of at least 
one course of action which, if successful, will bring about the desired effects. What 
follows is a brief explanation of each of the components. 
Criticality is a multi-layered component of the SOTP. As the collective analysis 
descends through the levels of war (and the layers of systems, the target system, the sub-
systems, the complexes and components of the target system), the information regarding 
the target system and its components becomes much more granular. Once a target system 
and the contained sub-systems and components are thoroughly understood, absolute and 
relative value distinctions between components of the target complexes and sub-systems 
can be established.  
Accessibility is determined by the degree to which friendly forces or surrogates 
can make contact with the target actor or node to accomplish whatever the desired 
outcome requires. This component is traditionally thought of in terms of getting U.S. 
forces to a target site and to returning them to friendly territory again. In network terms, 
this is not necessarily so, though it may include such considerations particularly for kill 
or capture, or recovery missions. In the new context, it may refer to an ability to reach 
someone via the Internet or by transmission of a message or warning via clandestine 
personal or impersonal communications. As the term access is expanded to include 
targeted influence operations, the means can include idea leaders, mentors, and religious 
and other advisors.   
The component recuperability refers to the estimated or known ability of a 
network to self-repair or adjust to damage inflicted by loss or disruption of an actor or 
node.124  Two of the most expedient methods of recuperability are redundancy and 
overlapping responsibilities. Redundancy is merely having dual or more parallel roles or 
mechanisms, so any redundancy that is built into the network being analyzed, and affects 
the targeted sub-system, must be considered as detrimental to the mission and must be 
accounted for in the developed course of action. Responsibility overlap means that roles 
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and functions are shared by more than one actor or mechanism and loss of one a few 
actors or nodes may not necessarily mean loss of the capability to the network. 
Vulnerability is the fourth component of the CARVER analysis process. 
Vulnerability is a two-fold consideration. The first aspect is target-centric and the other is 
focused on friendly assets available for the mission. An actor or a network is vulnerable if 
it possesses a weakness that can be exploited. Traditionally, this is thought of as a person 
or a place being undefended or weakly defended from kinetic attack. In network 
methodology, vulnerability is widened to include trust issues, structural holes, principal-
agent problems, and other symptoms of weakening structure or processes. The friendly 
force-oriented aspect concerns assets available and effective employment capabilities. If 
the friendly force is lacking either of these aspects, then the vulnerability will go 
unexploited. However, it may still be able to be monitored by the friendly force, in 
continued preparation for when assets or capabilities become available.125 
The effects component can consume the greatest amount of the analyst’s time, 
especially if the appropriate level of expertise is not available to assist with the analysis.  
“The target should be attacked only if the desired…effects can be achieved.”126  While 
the special operations targeting joint publication states that the intended effects may 
consist of any or all of the elements of national power (military, intelligence, diplomacy, 
legal, information, finance, economic)127 and a strong emphasis is placed upon the effects 
on the local population, it does not focus on network effects. Three aspects of complexity 
come to the forefront with this component: non-linearity, ordering in dis-equilibrium, and 
self-organization.*  The net effect of these aspects of complexity is that traditional linear 
cause-and-effect notions are replaced by “fractal” spreading of information and effects of 
intervention.128  Here, fractal means that the internal and external edges of an 
organization do not conform to a line-and-block chart or the flow of information not 
conforming to predictable trajectories of diffusion, like a contagion. Tracing the flow of 
information through a complex network will show uneven diffusion across the graph with 
growth characterized by fits and starts as nodes of various centrality strengths receive and 
transmit the information.   
                                                 
* Refer back to Chapter 1 for discussion of the relevant aspects of complexity theory. 
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As information flows across the network, the actors will react to the information 
as they receive it. This will trigger reactions to the information in accordance with the 
role and position of the actor and his relations (mainly expectant trust) with his network 
neighbors.*  At any given moment, there will be multiple waves of information flowing 
through the network simultaneously, with ripples of information and individual and 
collective reactions to the information constantly overlapping as they wash across the 
organization. In this manner, the network will constantly be in a state of informational 
and organizational dis-equilibrium. Actors will be continuously adjusting to each other’s 
reactions to the information as well as to the information itself. Members will re-evaluate 
their trust levels in each other subsequent to each new bit of information shared. This 
applies to groups as well as individuals, with internal group dynamics (cohesiveness, 
centrality and levels of trust in the exchanges) between individuals coloring the net 
reaction at the group level. It is in this way that the net effects of any type of intervention 
into a system must be assessed and evaluated by the operator-analysts and planners.   
The last component of the CARVER tool is recognizability. The concept of 
recognizability as applied to physical structures in the manual also have applicability in 
the human terrain—necessity to be able to visually differentiate the actual targeted actor 
from others. In dealing with the structure of relations across a network, being able to 
identify structural stress-points which, if able to induce failure, would cause collapse or 
disruption of the system in the intended manner is also very useful.†  While it is vital to 
be able to physically recognize a targeted actor or node in a network, it may not always 
be feasible. What if the analyst has no physical description?  Or, what if the analyst does 
not have information about the internal structure or membership of a group within a 
larger network, yet he must develop a plan to intervene against the group’s influence?  To 
answer these questions, we must look to the idea of information triangulation. 
                                                 
* Assuming the ability to monitor communication flow has not been undermined, the 
information flow patterns between actors will mirror the pattern of previous exchanges 
unless something changed about the relationship itself or communication capability. 
 
† While the current manuals give a nod to information operations targeting, it is computer network-
focused and does not explicitly address the human terrain or dark network intervention. 
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Data triangulation is a method to overcome a lack of direct access to information 
by compiling and aggregating information from different information sources 
surrounding the targeting problem.129  What it lacks in precision about the problem in 
question, it makes up for in knowledge surrounding the problem, thereby gaining intimate 
detail about the social patterns and trends around the problem and insight into how the 
problem itself influences its environment, and vice versa. This is not unlike the manner in 
which scientists study black holes; while black holes are invisible due to the inability of 
light and other electromagnetic radiation to escape the hole’s gravitational pull and be 
detected by telescopes, astronomers are able to measure the effects of the tremendous 
forces at work by watching the stars and other matter in the vicinity of the black hole 
behave in accordance with physical laws because of the influence of the black hole.130   In 
network terms, this analogy equates to monitoring the actors in the network 
neighborhood around the mystery actor or group for influences from that actor of group. 
Over time, patterns and trends can be detected and compared so reasonable expectations 
can be derived about future influences and probable target and target neighborhood 
reactions to intervention and, thus, plans to eliminate or mitigate the emergent influences 
can be developed. While this idea may or may not assist in creating a Special Operation 
Target Intelligence Package for a direct action (assault) mission, it will certainly assist in 
development of targeting guidance for influence operational planning or in constructing a 
plan for further intelligence collection. 
SOF use the CARVER method at all three levels of war, in exactly the same 
manner, but using information detail appropriate  to the level of analysis. For CARVER 
to be efficiently used and targeting decisions to be understood, each echelon may define 
the values at that echelon in absolute terms. Those values must be understood across all 
levels of analysis and must be in accordance with the commander’s intent, and agreed 
upon expert assessments of friendly force capabilities and limitations, knowledge of the 
target itself, the larger systems in which the target is embedded, the physical terrain, the 
weather, and other environmental factors. Figure 10 displays a notional CARVER value 
rating scale for use across the three levels of analysis. Any discrepancies in or new 
information concerning any of the above factors must be integrated into the analysis of all 
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echelons. This may require partial or entirely new analysis, depending upon the assessed 
impact of the new information. The impact of first-hand knowledge of critical aspects of 
the target and target systems cannot be understated. 
Another peculiarity of SOF is the ability to gain or recruit the expertise and 
technical resources to affect such depth of analysis. This highlights another difference 
between special operations and the conventional military, as the conventional military’s 
approach to evaluating options frequently consists of force ratios (comparing numbers of 
friendly and enemy aircraft or tanks, for example) and “troop-to-task” analysis of 
numbers of assets as compared to the number of targets capable of being attacked by 
types of weapons systems. Conversely, SOF do not possess large numbers of troops or 
aircraft, nor are they rapidly regenerated in the event of casualties, so they necessarily 
must be selective and deliberative in their targeting and risk management.   
When each echelon completes its analysis, the lower echelon refines its 
information requirements and then completes its own analysis. Some portions of analysis 
and planning are completed concurrently between the echelons out of necessity but some 
resources are scarce (such as expertise in some technical aspects of a target system) and 
require sharing. Figures 11, 12 and 13 display CARVER matrices developed for the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of analysis against a notional hostile state. 
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Figure 10. A notional CARVER matrix rating scale defining values to be used later in 
the process. These values are drawn from data about friendly forces’ capabilities, the 
target itself, the larger systems in which the target is embedded, and other environmental 
factors, as well as the unit commander’s preferences. From JP 3-05.2 Joint TTPs for 
Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning, 2003. 
 
Figure 11. An example of a strategic-level CARVER matrix. From JP 3-05.2 Joint 




Figure 12. An example of an operational-level CARVER matrix. From JP 3-05.2 
Joint TTPs for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning, 2003. 
 
Figure 13. An example of a tactical-level CARVER matrix. From JP 3-05.2 Joint 
TTPs for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning, 2003. 
The difference in information requirements and analysis outputs are evident in the 
size and detail of the above CARVER matrices. The strategic CARVER (Figure 11) 
compared only massive, national-level infrastructure systems such as transportation, bulk 
petroleum and communications. Of those systems compared, the analysts selected the 
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national electric power grid, and would have directed operational level analysts and 
planners to analyze the systems within the hostile state’s national electrical systems. 
The operational level CARVER matrix compared the subsystems as depicted in 
Figure 12. These analysts and planners concluded that the power generation subsystem 
was most feasible for attack, and directed the tactical planners to analyze the tactical 
subsystems and components within a particular generation plant for possible targets of a 
direct action assault. This plant is a hydroelectric dam. 
These tactical planners developed a CARVER matrix of their own (Figure 13) to 
determine the subsystems and components of those systems for destruction. They 
selected the turbine generators as their most feasible target, followed closely by the 
boilers, and the water filters and pumps, and then other components. As modern 
hydroelectric dams and the computing and mechanical systems that run them are 
extremely complicated, there is yet another decision the planners must make to execute 
this mission:  how to attack the turbine generators.   
Among the options available to special operations are 1) unilateral direct action, 
2) train and employ a human agent to carry out the on-site tasks, or 3) some combination 
of those two. Figure 14 depicts the addition of the social side of the equation: the 
bureaucracy and staff of the dam itself. 
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Figure 14. A hypothetical hydroelectric dam system of systems. In special operations, 
technical and human systems must be considered together. While the military expertise 
resides with in the special operations team, the on-site technical and social expertise 
resides only within the native staff.131 
Now the planners have the information necessary to provide the commander—as 
the primary decision maker—a range of options to accomplish the mission. As 
demonstrated, the information and decision requirements vary from level to level, and 
correspond to the level of analysis being performed. The above discussion of the SOTP 
should bring out the conclusion that, while the SOTP was designed without social 
networks in mind, its treatment of a target as a system possessing and interacting with 
parallel systems and sub-systems within a larger environment also, successfully 
encompasses the major concepts of netwar. And, for what is does not specifically 
address, it allows for re-interpretation and expansion of the components to include 
practically all assessment and evaluative requirements to successfully address SNA input 
and intervention strategy information requirements. While the military has applied the 
SOTP and CARVER to irregular warfare for a few years now, it has not yet been 
 44 
combined with social network analysis to effectively combat terrorist or insurgent 
networks. Thus, the full potential of application to irregular warfare has not been realized. 
The next chapter is an introduction to SNA. 
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IV. INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
CONCEPTS AND METHODS 
 
Social networks are individuals and groups interacting to achieve some goal or 
fulfill a purpose. Networks are constantly expanding and contracting (increasing and 
decreasing in membership) for many purposes: to gain, disseminate, and respond to 
information; to collect and distribute resources; to make money; to cope with threats; or 
to create new knowledge.132  The field of study dedicated to measuring and 
understanding patterns of position and power is called social network analysis, or SNA. 
This chapter will introduce basic SNA concepts and processes in terms of dark networks 
sufficient to understand the linkage to the special operations targeting process, and to 
inform a combination of the two concepts to make a more effective tool for use in 
irregular warfare.  
SNA determines relative levels of power and influence according to members’ 
social ties. That is to say, SNA is a tool that can be used to understand an actor’s level of 
access to information and placement within a group or organization of interest to the 
analyst. While a primary desired outcome of SNA is “detecting and interpreting patterns 
of…ties between actors,”133 it is also intended to provide insight into characteristics of 
entire networks. SNA allows analysts to understand qualities of the network as a whole, 
as well as the qualities of individuals. The term “actor” applies to individual members of 
a network or to groups that interact with other groups, or between groups, within or 
between organizations, and may be extended to describing inter-state patterns in 
international relations. SNA measurements can indicate inter-group dynamics and social 
processes above the individual level.134 
A. KEY TERMS 
To use SNA, as in other fields of study, there is a family of terms that must be 
consistently used. The most fundamental of these are: 
Node. The basic unit of a network, a node (also called a vertex) can be a person—
usually termed an “actor”—or an object, place, attribute, event, or idea, depending upon 
the analysis under way. Nodes are uniquely named to prevent confusion.  
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Link. A link is a tie between two nodes indicating a relationship. On a graph, a 
link is a line drawn between two nodes. It may be valued as positive or negative, directed 
from one node to another, or otherwise valued to indicate the strength of relationship 
between nodes. A link is defined by its end points. 
Path. A path is a series of links between nodes in which no single node occurs 
more than once. It is defined by its end points, or by a set of points to differentiate it from 
other paths. A path is a tool used for network-wide measurements and for descriptions of 
a mechanism, or a set of relationships deliberately arranged. If there are more than two 
nodes with links between them, then multiple paths may be present.   
Graph. A graph is the visual layout of a network’s nodes and links. A graph may 
depict the smallest of networks, those of two or three nodes, or a large network consisting 
of hundreds or thousands of nodes. Nodes are distributed across the visual field by 
various mathematical formulas. 
While terms must be universally accepted, definitions can be relaxed to account 
for data gaps or other sources of systemic errors caused by strict definitions. This type of 
judgment is significant for analysts to understand and articulate, especially when fighting 
dark networks. However, using definitions and methods that are too relaxed may lead to 
new sources of systemic error and skew later analysis. In this manner, SNA requires 
balancing the science of quantitative analysis with the art of understanding the qualitative 
dynamics of the human terrain. Other terms will be introduced as required later in this 
and following chapters. 
B. SNA AND DARK NETWORKS 
Dark networks are a subset of social networks characterized by their illicit nature. 
Dark networks may function similarly to other “bright” or legitimate networks but are 
obscured with intentional secrecy or deception. In terms of observation and analysis, 
secrecy changes everything.   
The works of Simmel,135 Erickson,136 and Herdt137 tell us that groups maintaining 
secrecy are different from other groups, both in structure and in behavior, and spend 
enormous energy and resources to maintain their secrets. This is primarily because of 
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how the group relates to the surrounding environment—members must decide whom to 
allow into the fold, and whom to exclude. Secrecy changes much of what members of 
dark networks do on a day-to-day basis, and much of their time is spent making up for 
clumsiness or mistakes. Ironically, it the very secrecy that protects dark networks that 
also limits their growth and development.138 
What makes a network dark or illicit?  The evaluation of a network as being licit 
or illicit requires a look at the surrounding environment—it depends upon who controls 
the physical space in which the network is operating and whether the network is 
operating in compliance with or contrary to legal or social norms. If the network 
members are functioning contrary to the laws and norms of the local environment, then 
they must maintain some degree of secrecy or suffer punishment or expulsion, thus their 
network is a dark network. Further, every location in which the network exists is not 
uniform in laws and local norms and the network members modify their behavior 
accordingly as they pass through or operate across boundaries and cultures. Thus, a 
primary benefit of ungoverned spaces to a dark network that finds a home there is that it 
may use it as sanctuary, thus saving resourcing and energy for the places where members 
must maintain cover and conceal their actions. Correspondingly, analysis of networks in 
their varying social contexts cannot be monolithic either. 
There may be some physical or virtual places where a network can operate in the 
open and other places where it must remain dark to avoid repression or attack. Dark 
networks, then, are not necessarily confined to those places where it must operate in 
complete and utter secrecy. The mere risk of a threat to its purpose, membership, or 
existence is sufficient for it to remain a dark network to survive and function. It is this 
secrecy and inherent threat to the investigator which demands particularly rigorous 
methodologies for discovery and tracking that are currently uncommon in traditional 
SNA research. This is where the primary contributions of special operations and 
intelligence activities can supply the information necessary for SNA of dark networks. 
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C. ANALYTICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Like every intelligence and planning process, SNA is subject to limitations which 
require using assumptions to overcome. In general, there are three basic planning 
problems with SNA that have an especially severe impact on analysis of dark networks:  
Incomplete information. Not everything that influences network formation or 
flows will be apparent to the analyst. When analyzing dark networks, such as 
insurgencies, terrorist groups or underground movements, this is compounded by secrecy 
and deception. 
Fuzzy boundaries. When collecting and analyzing data concerning a dark 
network, the limits of the network are likely unknown and variable, and dependent upon 
many factors, not the least of which are the analyst’s desired outcomes of the 
investigation. As information accumulates, the analyst must determine exactly whom to 
include in the network and whom to exclude.139  Not only is this a function of the level of 
analysis, but also of the fact that people are members of multiple layers of networks 
simultaneously and may be key players in some social settings but peripheral in others.   
For example, an actor can be a patriarch of a kinship network, a middle-level 
manager in a workplace network, an “on again-off again” golf buddy in a friendship 
affiliation network, and a non-practicing member of a religious group. Including more or 
less data in the scope of the investigative process will change the outputs of the tools used 
to assess and evaluate the target network. Using too much or too little data can skew 
findings and perhaps lead analysts and planners in the wrong direction. 
Dynamic nature of networks. Social networks are always changing. Membership 
waxes and wanes and internal organization, information pathways, and distribution of 
resources, responsibilities and tasks are constantly adjusting to internal and external 
influences. Actors may join a network but may remain inactive until certain conditions or 
events trigger their activation. Or, members may participate in the beginning of their 
experience, but their participation may taper off or terminate over time. Thus, total 
membership may not always be meaningful, but it depends on the goals of the analysis. It 
remains up to the analyst to decide when and how an actor counts and in what context.   
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As a corollary, an undesirable but expected outcome of investigation into dark 
networks is that, upon discovering that it is a target of an investigation, network members 
will take measures to adapt to the investigator’s activities and disappear from view. If 
discovered, an investigator risks negating some or all of the known data about the 
network. Thus, to avoid threats to the investigation, it behooves the investigating element 
to conceal its own activities to the utmost.140  
For analysts and planners, there are many useful aspects of SNA output 
information about dark networks and social networks in general, but what is required of 
those analysts and planners from the outset is a thorough recognition of the concepts 
behind the methods and outputs so the appropriate input data can be collected. John 
Scott’s handbook of SNA presents an easy to understand breakdown of types of 
sociological data collected for study: relational, attribute, and ideational.141  This thesis 
explores relational and attribute data of actors as relevant to understanding the match 
between SNA and the SOTP, but ideational data can be important for understanding the 
shape and flow of ideas and how ideas are related. 
D. DOING SNA: COLLECTING INPUT DATA 
The concepts associated with the conduct of SNA data collection, analysis and 
interpretation, and dissemination constitute the remainder of this chapter. Using specific 
input data and analytical software, SNA output data can then be depicted graphically, 
analyzed mathematically, and used to build a framework for designing an intervention 
strategy. A planner can apply the same concepts for formulating an assessment strategy to 
measure progress. 
While positional and relational data comprise the majority of SNA input data, 
they do not stand alone as there are geographical and temporal* relationships to the data 
as well. Most depictions of social networks are merely a snapshot in time in the life cycle 
of a network; the membership and structural changes in a network over time must be 
explicitly described in SNA. For example, a person who joins a network does so at a 
                                                 
* Temporal information is time-oriented data describing arrival, departure or duration of some 
relevance. 
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specific time, which is after the previous members joined the group and before any 
subsequent members joined. Thus, if an analyst were to be looking for participants in a 
certain event that took place at time T, then the analysis would specifically exclude any 
members of the network who had not yet joined by time T. Or, if that same analyst was 
looking for participants in the same event, then he could exclude those members of the 
network who are known to be in other regions or under surveillance at the event time as 
they could not have participated in the actual event. It is this kind of assessment that, 
while it may be intuitive, is a necessary element of analysis and that data must be 
explicitly accounted for during analysis. 
On relations between actors, a common relationship considered practical and 
worthy of analysis is direct communication, followed by known participation in a specific 
event, and then by known membership in a formal or informal organization.142  An 
example of the first is reporting that actor A talked to actor B by phone. An even more 
precise disaggregation of the input information would be that actor A used phone X to 
call actor B at phone Y at time T. Thus, we have five data points from one bit of 
information. Depending upon the level of sophistication of the technology at the analyst’s 
disposal, he could even have geographical data* regarding the phones’ locations at the 
time of the call as well as actual ownership data for the phone numbers leading us to 
seven or nine data points from this one collection instance.   
Another aspect of communication, specific to the more sophisticated dark 
networks, is the use of tradecraft† for clandestine communication procedures and 
methods. Tradecraft can be both technical and non-technical in nature, and the number 
and variety of techniques employed is limited only by the creativity, resourcefulness, 
daring and skill of the involved parties. One example of technical tradecraft is the 
embedding of encrypted messaged in image and other types of files that are emailed or 
posted on Internet websites for retrieval by another Internet user located anywhere in the 
                                                 
* So-called “geo-tagging.”  Another form of this capability is accessible to civilians via the GPS 
functions on current “smart” cellular phones.  The physical location of photos taken with smart phones and 
directly uploaded to the Internet can be determined by reading the meta-data embedded in every digital 
photo. 
† Tradecraft is a term for the employment of methods and procedures to conduct operations while 
under, or suspicion of, surveillance or suppression by opposing forces or agencies.  
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world. An example of non-technical tradecraft is the use of “dead drops” where messages 
are concealed at specific, secret locations known only to the sending and receiving parties 
who visit the site at different times to prevent any direct association by an outside 
observer.   In this manner, depending upon the relative skills of the competing entities, 
the direct communication links may not be visible to an observer. Sometimes face-to-face 
conversations between two skilled, but unfamiliar agents are the most secure form of 
communication because of the apparent randomness of the event.   
Direct communication is only one of many types of relations between actors. 
While direct communication may seem to be the most likely avenue for transmission of 
information, such is not necessarily the case with the advent of the mass media and, in 
particular, the cyber domain. One term for this phenomenon is “open-source warfare,” or 
OSW.143  The key characteristics of OSW is that there need only be a medium for 
broadcasting of information, preferably in a persistent state, so otherwise un-connected 
actors can receive the same information. In a concept taken from the insect world, John 
Robb describes this as “stigmergy” or the ability to transmit and receive signals without 
direct connection.144 Television, radio and the Internet are the prime examples of OSW 
media, but just about any other similar broadcast media can accomplish the same effect 
as long as the intended audience is able to receive the message.   
Aside from communication and influence, affiliations and attribution data often 
provide grounds for analysis of useful patterns and trends between actors and groups. 
Commonalities in life experiences, education, geographical or physical proximity, 
community membership, and other significant forming experiences provide data 
regarding attributes of actors that may provide insight into previously unseen patterns and 
between actors. In certain circumstances, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
operations, key players attending an important meeting or other collaborative event will 
be the most meaningful attributional data.145  Such relevant historical information may go 
back years and require a substantial amount of research to be of use. 
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E. DOING SNA: OUTPUT DATA AND ITS USEFULNESS IN 
 INTERPRETING FOR PATTERNS AND INDICATORS. 
Understanding the expression and interpretation of SNA data output is equally 
important to understanding how input data is collected, recorded, manipulated and 
measured. SNA data—both input and output - can be considered in two modes: 1-mode 
and 2-mode.  1-mode data is used to study relations between like actors—people to 
people, for example.  2-mode data is used to analyze the relationships between two unlike 
but connected objects—such as people to places, places to time, etc. When combined, 2-
mode data can become attributional data to give context or strength to the1-mode direct 
relations data. Similarities in attributes among actors who are related can give credibility 
to otherwise sparse information concerning direct relations, but it all must be taken in 
context. 
There are two basic categories of SNA output data: graphical and numerical. 
Graphical expression (Figure 15) is accomplished by producing a graph of a network 
using symbols for nodes to represent individual actors (persons or groups of people, 
depending upon the level of analysis being conducted), and lines to depict the relations 
between actors. While manipulation of symbols and other visual indicators of 
measurements may frequently be best expressed visually on a graph or chart of a 
network, sometimes the nuance of relative strength or direction of relations is better 
expressed in numbers. 
Numerical SNA output information is generally laid out in tables according to the 
type of data and measurements used. These tables can include variations of those 
measurements in sometimes long, parallel lists of numbers that mean little to an observer 
until analyzed with Microsoft Excel or other data manipulation software. The importance 
of the analytical capabilities of Excel or other software cannot be overstated, but the 
depth of analysis must not outrun the quality of the input data, given Sparrow’s three 
analytical assumptions.*  
 
                                                 
* Incomplete information, fuzzy boundaries and the dynamic nature of networks. 
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Figure 15. Three types of displays of SNA data: graphical output (left), a portion of a 
relational data table (center), and matrix data (right) used to make graphs similar to the 
one on the left. 
With regard to designing graphical output, the options for using symbols to depict 
important attributional, relational, temporal or geospatial data is limited only by the 
analyst’s creativity and sophistication of the systems used to conduct the analysis. 
Currently, symbols are limited to what our SNA software allows. But it really depends on 
what is useful and necessary for the analyst to know and how to describe what he knows.   
1. Direct Relations 
The same decisions concerning displaying sufficient information graphically 
apply to how relations between actors are depicted. If all that is important is that a link 
between actors exists, then a simple line suffices. If the amount of communication is 
important, and the direction (incoming and out-going) is also important, then such could 
be expressed in a directed graph, or di-graph, with some depiction of increased value or 
strength to that link—such as a thicker line or a numeral adjacent to the line. If the 
collaborative or adversarial nature of a relationship is important, then a positive or 
negative value could be assigned. In short, the essence of graphical representation is to 
say with pictures what could be a thousand words. See Figure 16.   
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Figure 16. Graphs depicting increasingly sophisticated depictions of a triad network. 
Left to right, a simple graph showing nodes and links, a valued graph with the B-C link 
having a higher value, a di-graph with a higher-valued B-C link, and a di-graph showing 
an A-B coalition against C.146  Triads are critical to understanding some of the most 
fundamental of social dynamics like choices and exchanges. 
The expression of positivity-negativity and relative strength of ties within social 
networks has significant implications for interpreting SNA data with regard to assessing 
trust and potential future interactions between actors. Because “trust is a bet about the 
future contingent actions of others,”147 a valued link may be useful to an analyst because 
it gives insight into the nature of a relationship and future transactions. It follows that if a 
long-lasting, strongly positive tie between two actors indicates a high level of trust to act 
favorably toward each other, then it follows that an equally strong and long-lasting but 
negative relationship may also indicate that a high level of expectation anticipation 
between the two actors to behave negatively toward each other. This gives rise to 
indicators of coalitions and factions within social networks. Some of these groupings 
have specific qualifications and definitions. 
2. Dyads and Triads 
David Krackhardt has explored George Simmel’s148 and Mark Granovetter’s149 
lines of thought concerning dyadic and triadic dynamics—or a range of a person’s 
choices when analyzed as a member of groups of two or three direct and mutual 
relationships. Dyads are direct relations between two people and may be characterized 
here as strong or weak, with each member having power to control the relationship. 
Granovetter’s work on the strength of weak ties revealed that one person’s distant 
relationship with another may provide critical access to new information and resources, 
as well as access to distant groups of people, and may make relatively weak ties more 
advantageous than a whole range of strong ties, particularly over time.150  Thus, a dyad, 
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as the smallest form of network relations, may prove to be extremely strong and safe as 
long as the two members can get along. 
Dyads are also extremely vulnerable. When there is only one network option 
available to a person or group, then the actor to whom the group is connected becomes 
extremely powerful. Since all information or resources must flow through that one node, 
then the role of that node can take on shades of gatekeeper, coordinator, representative, 
liaison or broker.151  This dynamic can wield significant power over large groups 
connected only by a single dyadic relationship. 
In triads, or relations of three mutually-connected members, Krackhardt defines a 
Simmelian tie between two people “if they are reciprocally and strongly tied to each other 
and they each reciprocally and strongly tied to a mutually-shared third person.”152  
Krackhardt characterized Simmelian ties as “super strong and sticky” to describe their 
resilience and durability over time. While these kinds of relations can be an expression of 
trust based on duration or history of the relationship, frequency of interaction, affinity 
and reciprocity, they are also a source of other factors shaping a member’s behavior. 
These are 1) reduced individuality, 2) reduced bargaining power, and 3) enhanced 
conflict resolution resulting in conformity to the larger group’s expectations.153 
The critical instrument derived from these ideas is that people’s choices and 
actions are, at least in part, determined by their social network’s structure. When an actor 
is a member of a dyad only, he has power to sever the relationship, but both parties lose 
access to what the other brought to the relationship. When actors are members of a 
Simmelian tie, the behavior of all three is modified and shaped by the choice each 
possesses in the presence of the third member. That is, each member knows that if he 
breaks ranks with the others, they will be able to maintain their relations without him. 
Exclusion is punishment.   
The power and constraints within dyads and triads are very important. Strong, 
unique dyadic ties are very powerful but vulnerable to manipulation by one or the other 
member. Triads can lead to successful group behavior, but too many triads can lead to 
redundant (non-new) information pools and stagnation. The implications of these tandem 
theories are instrumental to shaping and attacking dark networks as structural sources of 
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power and access to information or resources may be used to force entry into a dark 
network’s neighborhood and coerce a group to change its structure or activities.  
3. Structural Holes, Secrecy and Synchronization 
Ron Burt describes structural holes as “disconnections” in social network 
structure to be filled by those seeking advantage in associated transactions.154  While the 
emphasis in most academic literature for structural holes is for the implementation and 
growth of social capital in market and corporate contexts, the idea certainly applies to 
dark networks. There are significant information and control advantages for the actor 
who brokers or closes the gap between two other parties in need of mutually beneficial 
exchanges. The information advantage comes in the form of access, timing and referrals. 
That is to say, an actor who bridges a structural hole has access to information not 
available to all members, awareness of information before others get it and status in other 
members’ minds for information and resource garnering.155   The control advantages are 
implicit in the uniqueness of this position: the actor can choose what to share. 
Granovetter’s strength of weak ties makes an important contribution to this kind of 
relationship building as weak ties close the gap between non-redundant sources of 
information.156 
For dark networks, structural holes are very special considerations. The 
imperative of secrecy demands a protective shell of structural holes for the mere 
necessity of limiting the flow of information to only those intended. This applies both 
externally and internally to the network (i.e.: compartmentation of functional cells or 
mechanisms to protect the larger network from compromise of one or more of those sub-
groups). Holes in networks diminish their density and detract from their cohesion 
measurements. That makes identifying the boundaries of a network even more difficult, 
since density, cohesion, and blockmodeling157 may be used as indicators of network 
membership boundaries. Alternatively, a group surrounded by structural holes with few 
connections to outside actors, may very well be an easily identifiable network. 
Employment of gatekeepers, brokers, or liaisons elongates information pathways and 
diminishes centrality and other measurements that could bring key players to light. 
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Attrition of non-redundant cells or members from attacks or compromise creates 
structural holes. The loss of a non-redundant broker or gatekeeper connecting two or 
more cells or within a chain can mean the loss of communication and, therefore, 
synchronization of actions. Due to the illicit nature of dark networks, recruiting 
replacements is difficult and communications conducted by highly specialized tradecraft 
techniques are not easily re-established. Thus, dark network members must maintain a 
balance between secrecy and synchronization.   
4. Network Density 
The concept of social network density, and variations of density, can be displayed 
by graphical representations as well as mathematical measurements. Density refers to the 
volume of links between nodes in a network. It is a computation of the number of actual 
links (provided by the input data) as compared to the total number of possible links, given 
the number of nodes presented in the input data. Without introducing mathematical 
formulas, network density reflects the quantity of relations of members within a network 
and some qualities about the network as a whole.158  Mathematically, density is measured 
on a scale between zero and 1.0, with the maximal value indicating complete density 
where there can be no more ties established. Visually, variations in density can only be 
detected by extreme differences or in very small networks (see Figure 17). To measure 
density across very large networks, SNA software must be used.   
 
Figure 17. An example of a relatively dense network (left) and a relatively sparse, or 
low density, network (right). There are far more triads in the denser network, which could 
have behavioral implications for members. 
Key to understanding the density measurements are the variations in density, 
which show evidence of sub-groups, cliques, and core-periphery boundaries in networks. 
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Changes in density across a network can also indicate benign demarcations of lesser-
connected social groups within the larger network or gaps in intelligence. If the data are 
reliable, changes in density could represent schisms or other meaningful sub-groupings of 
network members. Graphically, density changes are depicted by a portion or portions of 
the network which are very highly-interconnected—representing a denser core or sub-
group—and other areas which are less interconnected and show fewer ties between 
actors. The impact of Figure 18 should be not only the visual difference in density of ties 
between actors, but also the difference in the number of Simmelian options by way of the 
number of possible triads available to each member of the core vice the number available 
to members of the periphery. Thus, higher density measurements increase the likelihood 
of resilience and durability of the network as a whole, due to the internal maintenance 
effects of the many Simmelian ties available to members of a denser network. There may 
also be implications for potential isolating effects of a network core or other subgroups 
since the number of triads diminishes as we cross the boundary from core to periphery. 
 
Figure 18. A network graph demonstrating the variation in density between the 
highly-interconnected core (inside the dashed circle) and the lesser-connected periphery. 
In very large networks, subgroups may not be so easily determined, but the difference in 
volume of network options available to members is significant. 
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5. Subgroups 
Moving beyond dyads and triads, definitions of subgroups identified in SNA 
range from very strict to fairly relaxed and adaptable to a given dataset. Subgroups exist 
based on ties amongst network members (as in one-mode networks) and are named 
according to their method of measurement: cliques, cores, and clusters. While there are 
several names within those categories for the various subgroups, the subgroups with 
built-in flexible definitions may be of the most use due to the three analytical 
assumptions from earlier in this chapter. Being able to relax or otherwise modify the 
definitions changes the parameters of the mathematical formulas used and allows the 
analyst to experiment with the data to ensure honest analysis that answers relevant 
questions about the network. 
F. DOING SNA: CENTRALITY MEASURES AND THE KEY PLAYER 
 PROBLEM  
Measurements of centrality are at the heart of SNA and give indications of 
network members who are relatively more knowledgeable and powerful than others. One 
term for those actors of relative importance is a Key Player.159  Centrality measures are 
some of the tools useful for identification of Key Players, or those network members 
valued above other members. This is not absolute, however, as a member’s position 
within a network is merely indicative of access to an information pool and placement 
within a field of possible informational streams. The previous concepts of trust and role, 
together with access and placement are critical factors in determining the power of a 
specific actor in a network. It is important to remember that these measurements provide 
the quantitative evaluation of actors, and the analyst must apply a qualitative filter based 
on facts or valid and necessary assumptions. 
1. The Key Player Problem 
The Key Player Problem, as defined by Stephen Borgatti, has two modes: first is 
finding the Key Player who is maximally connected to the most relevant information 
paths in the network (known as KPP-Positive) and second is identifying a Key Player 
according to the overall network’s dependence upon him for cohesion (called KPP-
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Negative). KPP-Positive is intended to focus on the actors who are best-positioned for 
information dissemination across the network. KPP-Negative is to determine which actor 
or actors are uniquely positioned so as to be the most damaging if removed from the 
networks in which they are embedded.160  Depending on which mode you are using and 
the purpose of the analysis, different types of centrality are more useful, but all can 
provide information about the structure of the target network and the location and identity 
of key players within. 
2. Centrality Measures 
There are several types of centrality, and more are being developed, but the most 
commonly used are degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality. Many of 
the newly-developed measurements are combinations or refinements of these basic 
measurements. 
Degree centrality is a measurement of the number of direct ties an actor has to 
other actors, or how many people someone knows. It indicates the potential for direct 
communication activity.161  An actor with high degree centrality can be called a “hub” 
due to the graphical representation resembling a wagon wheel with the hub–the actor–in 
the middle of radiating spokes to other actors. This is also referred to as “local” centrality 
because it is a measurement of all the nodes based upon their 1-degree network 
neighborhood. Referring to Figure 19, actor A has the highest degree centrality, because 
he is directly connected to more members than anyone else in the sample. Actors F and G 
are the next highest-scoring members.162 
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Figure 19. A kite graph for demonstrating centrality measurements and the 
corresponding centralities. In the lower chart, actor A has the highest degree centrality, 
actors A, F and G have the highest closeness centrality and actor H has the highest 
betweenness centrality. 
Closeness centrality measures the distance from any node to the edge of the 
network. As such, it provides a glimpse of “global centrality”163 or how central an actor 
is to the overall network. It is indicative of who may be most aware of information and 
events across the network.164  Actors F and G have the highest closeness centrality 
because they are the closest to all other members.  
Betweenness centrality of a node is a measurement of how many possible 
information pathways are intersected by that node. In the same figure, actor H has the 
highest betweenness centrality because all nodes must pass information through him in 
order to reach the far left and right boundaries of the illustrated network. A nodes 
betweenness centrality may indicate a potential point of control of information flow 






























Eigenvector centrality. The eigenvector centrality measurement came about 
because network researchers recognized that sometimes an actor’s power comes not from 
his own reach or volume of relations, but from that of whom he knows. In lay terms, it’s 
all about who you know and the number of their direct connections.166  In Figure 20, 
actors K, N, S and T come out with a very high eigenvector centrality score. Actors from 
J leftward all rate very low, and those actors surrounding that core group all rate in the 
median. The low-ranking members do not have network neighbors who know very many 
people, especially compared to the actors in the more populous side of the graph. So, if 
an actor is structurally positioned, trusted, and accessible as K, N, S and T are, then he or 
she will be a critical asset to the two groups located on either side. The implications of 
power through situational awareness and control for a core of members like this are 
obvious.* 
 
Figure 20. A graph to demonstrate the eigenvector centrality. Actors K, N, S and T 
are highest in eigenvector centrality because they are directly related to members who 
have more direct relations, in part, because their end of the network is larger. 
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G. DOING SNA: INDIVIDUAL ACTOR MICRO-ANALYSIS 
Analysis of individual actors in a network starts with the input data about him or 
her. An important step beyond the facts and assumptions about types of actor relations, 
and where SNA helps tremendously, is the associations that stem from those attributes. 
Relationships with groups of people with like attributes may be indicative of the actor’s 
embeddedness qualities. Said another way, actors of like attributes and relationships with 
one another may indicate a layer of the subject actor’s network neighborhood. For 
example, relationships with a group of people, who are also interconnected, who all have 
an affinity for playing poker on a certain night at a certain location belong to a single 
layer of an actor’s network. That same actor will also have relations with a group of 
people calling themselves by a common family name, constituting a second layer to the 
actor’s network neighborhood. Thus, he is embedded in both social groups. Analyzing a 
particular actor’s range of relationships will likely present evidence of multiple layers of 
networks—this is the network revelation of embeddedness. When layering the relevant 
networks over one another, the importance of this actor should become apparent.  
1. Ego-network Analysis 
In network analysis, true understanding of an individual actor includes 
understanding his friends, family, co-workers and other associates. This is portrayed 
graphically in his ego-network, or ego-net. In theory, an actor’s ego-net should tell us 
much about that actor. Among other attributes and relations, an analyst should be able to 
extrapolate what are the primary sources of information and influence for the target actor, 
as well as his ability to control or influence others. The attributes of the actors in his ego-
net should say something about his beliefs, attitude, and trust patterns. The age or 
duration of ego-net membership can give insight into some of the processes which 
require trust and influence such as advice and mobilization to action. An example of an 
ego-net—actor A’s ego-net—extracted from a larger network for analysis is in Figure 21. 
If the ego-net is very dense, and its members have been friends for many years, and have 
shared experiences such as school attendance, youth club membership, and all have 
witnessed the violent death of at least one parent or sibling at the hands of a government 
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agent then the group can be said to be very embedded in many respects. So there are 
several descriptions that an analyst can derive from the group social processes167 and 
constraints under which the actor operates.168  
 
 
Figure 21. Extraction of an ego-network for analysis. In this instance, actor A’s 
egonet has ten actors, or nodes with whom A has direct ties. The left-most graph is a 
complete network of A’s embedded relations; the top-right is the extracted graph of A’s 
full 1-degree ego-net relations; the lower-right is A’s ego-net as a hub-and-spoke graph. 
In a world of finite resources and time constraints, the SNA analyst’s findings 
ought to inform the commander’s priorities. The priorities concerning which key players 
to pursue first and subsequently, where to direct further analysis and how to seek 
maximal positive effect given imposed limitations can be informed by meaningful SNA. 
The decisions concerning rank-ordering of network members, pathways, and even 
methods of direct or indirect intervention will combine the information given by 
centrality measures, network-wide measures such as density or cohesion, and individual 
member micro-analysis. The changes in structure and roles induced by first, second, and 
third-order effects of specific acts of intervention—and overall positive and negative 
effects across the network’s neighborhood due to all interventions and environmental 
impacts -- must be considered. 
H. A FINAL WORD ON SNA CONCEPTS AND DARK NETWORKS. 
To construct a useful database of network relational information, a solid 
conceptual and practical grasp of SNA concepts and methods is a must. This conceptual 
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understanding should re-frame a special operations analyst’s overall demand for 
information and imply a change in the practical approach to intelligence analysis. As for 
the analyst, data entry is merely the beginning of a journey through the process—the end 
of which is unknown and may provide useful insights into some fundamental questions 
about the networks, key players and mechanisms in question. 
 Leading into Chapter V, analysis of a dark network using SNA should 
enable an analyst to proceed through an informed deliberate assessment process. Any 
assessment will begin with the fact that a threat group exists and must include enough 
data about its membership to begin analysis. In an example assessment tree in Figure 22, 
the first question forces a broad estimate of the target network’s functionality and 
capabilities, and the last completes the assessment with an estimate of intervention tools 
and resources available for employment. All answers with a “no” or “do not know” 
response require some combination of further examination of the target network and its 
neighborhood or assumptions about the network structure to be validated later. 
SNA is a very dynamic but still emerging methodology for understanding social 
networks. At its best, SNA will not be a cure-all for solving the targeting and planning 
dilemmas when fighting dark networks due to all the vulnerabilities of the fog of war and 
Sparrow’s planning assumptions. However, it provides a methodology for discovery and 
insight into our human conflict domain previously unseen in intelligence analysis and 
ought to change the manner in which we demand, collect, compile, analyze and interpret 
information about dark networks. The ensuing hybrid model of dark network analysis 
combines the concepts of special operations target analysis and SNA to inform the 




Figure 22. SNA assessment of network state process. 
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V. THE HYBRID METHOD: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
NETWORK ANALYSIS PROCESS 
 
A. STRATEGIC VIEW OF A NEW FRAMEWORK 
In wars amongst the people, “understanding the context of [an] operation is as 
important as understanding the superior commander’s intentions.”169  So, when engaging 
in irregular warfare, the target network’s embeddedness in the greater network 
neighborhood is a significant part of its context* and a vital level of analysis.170 The 
question of applying the special operations target analysis process to the human domain 
is that, until now, it lacked a framework for that domain analogous to the one that exists 
for technical systems. SNA provides that framework. Just as the organizational, technical 
and physical systems within a hydroelectric dam (see chapter 3) give structure to its 
analysis, SNA illuminates the structure and relationships of social networks. The idea of 
applying CARVER as an effects-based approach to an irregular warfare problem is not 
new,171 but it has not been applied using SNA concepts and methods. The essence of 
combining SNA and the special operations target analysis process, then, is matching 
applicable SNA concepts properly to the CARVER method used in target analysis and 
evaluation. This method is called the Special Operations Network Analysis Process, or 
SONAP. 
This chapter is focused on the process of SONAP intervention against dark 
networks. First, it blends the CARVER concepts of target analysis and SNA into an 
analytical tool, sketching out a typology of intervention concepts, and describing social 
network-based actions within those intervention concepts. Following the description of 
SONAP, it expands on the concept of dark network mechanisms and the purposes they 
serve within a dark network. The chapter concludes with a typology of social reactions to 
outside intervention. 
                                                 
* The other parts of a group’s context for this thesis are its narrative (its history, present situation and 
future destiny) and the operative culture that surrounds the group, its origins and its key players. 
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Briefly reviewing CARVER, we know that it can be used to analyze target 
systems—target networks—at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations. 
Again, actions at the tactical level (tactics) are routine procedures used to carry out the 
orders derived from the operational level plans intended to achieve the desired goals of a 
chosen strategy meant to eliminate a threat. Networks exist that can be characterized as 
strategic, operational, and tactical structures, and SNA can assist in understanding the 
structure of local, regional and national or international relationships that support an 
enemy’s campaign. The CARVER tool enables analysts and planners to disaggregate 
multiple, interconnected systems to their sub-systems and mechanisms, and describe how 
they are structured and connected. Combining CARVER and SNA is a method to give a 
describable and measurable structure to target systems involving social networks.  
B. UNIVERSALITY OF THE FRAMEWORK 
In keeping with CARVER’s applicability to all levels of war, the new model must 
also be applicable to all levels. Referring to Figure 23, we begin with pairing the three 
levels of war with three levels of networks as derived from Sydney Tarrow’s descriptions 
of interconnected local/tactical, regional/operational, and international/strategic actors 
involved in collective action.172  In this way, social networks may be analyzed at each 
level of war using CARVER to identify critical systems and sub-systems of social 




Figure 23. An example portrayal of international-strategic, regional-operational and 
local-tactical networks. Graphic by the author. 
C. COMBINING CARVER AND SNA 
Combining CARVER and SNA requires matching like and complimentary 
concepts. In so doing, there are matches that are conveniently complementary and some 
pairings that are not readily apparent and require some explanation. Some pairings 
support more than one CARVER concept. Figure 24 displays these pairings. SNA core 
concepts are not the only applicable concepts. Kathleen Carley’s application of the 
cognitive load concept is a key consideration when knowledge of network members’ 
intelligence, experience and personality types, such as extraversion and introversion, are 
known or templated.173 
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Figure 24. Matching CARVER concepts with SNA concepts. 
1. Criticality 
The pairings begin with the CARVER concept of Criticality. Criticality is the 
description of the importance of the roles and functions of an individual member, cell, or 
mechanism to the overall function and operations of the entire network. It must be noted 
that criticality in SNA is not confined to the traditional military ideas of critical 
capabilities, resources, and vulnerabilities. SNA concepts that indicate individual member 
criticality are centered on measures of global centrality, Borgatti’s Key Player Problem 
KPP-Pos and KPP-Neg measurements, identification of structural holes and brokers, 
cognitive load and—for directional networks—in-degree and out-degree. At the group 
level (cells or mechanisms), estimating criticality includes hierarchical clustering, 
pathway identification (what the military calls link analysis) and understanding the effect 
of structural holes between groups, or the structural holes in the relationships that embed  
a targeted sub-group in a larger grouping. 
2. Accessibility 
Accessibility is a description of the ways and means in which an organization 
could reach a targeted individual or group. Accessibility is divided into direct and 
broadcast access. Direct access requires infiltrating or influencing the targeted member’s 
 71 
ego net by point-to-point contact and may consist of physical or electronic contact. The 
first of two modes in which the Internet plays a role in accessing a targeted member is 
inherent in direct access via email, chat, messaging, and search function. Broadcast 
access presumes that the targeted member is not utterly isolated from all outside media by 
either first-person reception of media signals such as TV, radio or Internet, or that the 
targeted member’s ego net is not also isolated. While traditional radio broadcasts are 
geospatially anchored, that is that these signals are transmitted from fixed regional or 
near-by locations, satellite TV and the Internet are not but are still limited in that they 
both require a baseline level of infrastructure such as electricity, a satellite signal or an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP), and proper interface hardware and software with proper 
maintenance and updates. Effective geospatial-temporal analysis will allow analysts to 
establish a template of regular contacts, locations, and events that will enable 
synchronizing friendly activities to the enemy’s. Establishing action criteria along the 
lines of accessibility greatly improves chances of proper timing and successful outcomes 
of friendly actions, or cessation of activities. 
3. Recuperability 
Recuperability is the capacity to engage lost or diminished capabilities in the form 
of key players, functional cells, or mechanisms. Recuperability is future-oriented. There 
are two primary forms of recuperability in SNA terms: redundancy and regeneration.   
Redundancy, or having an on-hand member, cell, or mechanism that can assume the roles 
and functions of the lost capability is the more readily apparent of the two forms. These 
actors or social structures are already present in the network and may be analyzed as long 
as the analyst includes these structures in his fuzzy boundaries approach to identifying 
the limits of the network. A danger here is that these structures may not be activated and 
may be lying dormant while the primary actors are in operation.   
If task differentiation and distribution was somewhat evenly distributed according 
to individual and group capabilities, then other members may be able to assume the 
missing members’ tasks. This is where Carley’s cognitive load measure fits in. Network 
members may be able to assume the roles of lost members as additional duties or change 
roles altogether and redistribute the task load if it is not too much of a burden for the 
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group. Cognitive load is a very difficult set of attributes to collect against, let alone 
estimate the relative load-to-capacity ratio per individual and group, but it ought to be a 
point of analysis of a group redistributing tasks to make up for a lost member or 
subgroup. Network evidence of a group nearing a 1:1 ratio of load-to-capacity may be a 
change in the strong-tie structure and in- and out-degree centrality as the new workload 
consumes more time and energy and different relationships take higher priority. 
The other form of recuperability is regeneration. Assuming a reasonable amount 
of analysis was completed—and the analyst discovered the correct boundaries of the 
network—regenerative capacity may not be visible. These may be contained in network 
members’ weak tie relationships. Whether a member’s weak ties are unique to that 
member or consist of infrequent contact with the now missing members’ strong ties, these 
relationships are troublesome for analysis. There may be scant or no evidence collected 
whatsoever that would bring these relationships to an analyst’s attention. The only way to 
assess these relationships could be in hindsight or require a deep dive into network 
members’ histories to see if anything could be estimated as a reach-back option for 
regenerating a critical lost role or function. 
4. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is the two-fold view of network structural and interpersonal trust 
openings for intervention. On the network structural side, vulnerabilities can be 
determined by the presence or lack of structural holes within the network and between the 
network and local environmental actors (i.e.: local resource providers or key social elites) 
and between the local-tactical network neighborhood and the operational-regional or 
strategic-international networks, low numbers of triads or Simmelian ties, and a lack of 
social buffering between core members (with critical roles within vital functions) and the 
peripheral members. Trust vulnerabilities principally include the universal reliance of 
leaders upon managers and managers upon soldiers to do the work in the manner and 




Effects are the most difficult to translate from technical systems of the systems 
world to application in social networks, particularly when trying to predict intentions and 
future outcomes. This is because effects –reactions—are the most complex reflection of 
the structure of the network layers and dynamics within each layer and across multiple 
layers. Effects analysis is also the most reliant upon knowledge of key members’ 
cognition and awareness–something nearly impossible to guess and may require an 
extraordinary effort to establish a working knowledge. Key indicators of how effects will 
flow across a network will be measures of centrality, quantity of triads (especially highly 
central members of Simmelian triads with other key members), strong ties/weak ties, 
cohesive subgroups (especially cliques), structural equivalence, and structural holes. 
Analysis of the effects component may be partly informed by analysis from the 
Criticality and Recuperability components  (as in, once a critical node is removed, the 
first best option for replacing that node will be activated and employed, thus possibly 
shedding that member’s previous task load onto one or more other nodes). 
6. Recognizability 
As the last component of CARVER, recognizability may be the simplest to bridge 
from SNA. Recognizability refers to the ability of outside analysis to detect and identify 
specific members, cells or mechanisms. Traditionally, this meant readily identifiable 
physical appearance. In SNA terms, recognizability is the sum of key indicators of 
physical presence, communication patterns, intentions, known direct relationships, and 
actor-unique attributes or artifacts. Specific aspects of SNA that support recognizing 
someone by those indicators are ego network and geospatial-temporal analysis. When 
physical recognition is not possible, then identification of the pattern of others’ actions 
each time that member is in proximity will be the alternative recognition.*  Target 
members’ ego networks may behave in certain ways when the member they are around, 
and perhaps differently when they are not. When a certain subgroup changes actions in a 
                                                 
* See the description of information triangulation in the first chapter. 
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certain way whenever a neighboring subgroup is active, then analysts may establish that 
as a pattern and build plans for action based on that activity. 
D. THE TYRANNY OF THE STRUCTURAL HOLE 
The reader may notice the prevalence of structural holes in Figure 24. The 
significance of structural holes in the market economy of irregular conflicts cannot be 
overstated. Insurgent, social movement, and terrorist networks live or die by their ability 
to reach desired resources, enemy assets, target audiences and recruitment populations, 
all while retaining some level of secrecy. In the case of terrorist and insurgent networks, 
the level of secrecy required for survival and the costs of resources and time expended to 
maintain it can be extremely high.174  Those who cannot maintain it die or are 
imprisoned. For the members who survive and endure, the buffer that members build 
between themselves and those around them who are not part of the movement or group 
are real or effective structural holes. In a very real sense, good secrecy is a blanket of 
structural holes that is tightly controlled and monitored. So, the purposeful structural hole 
is not just a physical dimension of secrecy, but it is a cognitive one as well. And not just 
for secrecy or access and placement for intelligence collection. Breaching or brokering 
across a structural hole can be a basis for action, a motivation to mobilize recruits and 
resources, to broadcast ideas to the target audience. Enter the war of ideas.175 
Ideologies are structured ideas with larger meaning. Ideas, and identities derived 
from them, are best adopted under the influence of a narrative, or story, which makes a 
point and connects the dots for an audience, partly as a tool for mobilization.176  
Dissemination of political and social narratives is subject to the power of structural holes 
such as a group’s description of its history, its critical role in society and its destiny must 
be able to reach the desired audiences in palatable and believable ways in order to 
propagate and mobilize recruits and resources. The physical dimension of idea 
dissemination is one actor in proximity to another other, several or many actors via 
broadcast media; someone must do the reaching out  Within the realm of ideas, frame 
bridging and alignment are necessary to co-opt a target group’s narrative and demonstrate 
aligned grievances and destinies.177  These serve to inform or prescribe social or political 
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change and then motivate target audiences to action.178  The cognitive bridging process 
exists because there are cognitive structural holes in the network of ideas and 
motivations. If there is no transmission method or agent capable of reaching the intended 
target audience, then a structural hole exists between the group and the target population, 
and the group may wither and die or be condemned to isolation.   
E. INTERVENTION METHODS AND APPROACHES 
1. Typologies of Intervention 
The typology of intervention methods is comprised of four levels of targeting, 
four methods of action, and three time-based approaches to intervention. The four levels 
of targeting are: individual nodes or members, cells, mechanisms and networks. The four 
methods of action are: monitor, influence, replace, and eliminate. The three time-based 
approaches to intervention are:  individual, segmental, and sequential-viral. This typology 
is intended to give structure and relations to the key aspects of targeting such that the 
manner of intelligence collection against dark networks is fully informative and 
supportive of campaigns and operations. 
The purpose of targeting is to induce responses that change network structure or 
operational imperatives, or both. As noted earlier, these responses take the form of a 
hierarchy of effects: first, second, and third order effects. In wars amongst the people, the 
first order effect is cognitive, the second is communicative, and the third is physical or 
structural. It is this pattern that ripples across a network, causing choices to be made and 
communicated at every level impacted by the causal event. With this in mind, the actual 
form and manner of the interventions applied against a network must be carefully created 
according to the best information available concerning the network structure as it stands, 
and how these effects can be transmitted and interpreted. The actual interpretations by the 
network leadership will drive their preferences and, according to the relational and 
cognitive structure of the decision making body, lead to decisions about network 
structure and operations. 
The levels of targeting are in order of increasing scale of network formation: 
individual member, cell, mechanism, and network. Individual members or nodes are the 
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most basic building block of a network, and knowing their roles in dyads, triads and 
larger network formations are critical to understanding the financial, social, psychological 
and political capital investment into an endeavor.   
Cells are cohesive subgroups that are or approach all-channel cliques that have a 
collective purpose, based on the capabilities and capacities possessed by the cell 
members, and have one or very few direct relationships to outside actors. In network 
terms, cells are nearly surrounded by structural holes. Cells can be deliberate or natural 
social formations, but their internal dynamics are characterized by strong ties. That is, the 
members have frequent and meaningful internal communications and other exchanges. 
Members of a cell are very close and depend upon each other for many aspects of daily 
life, especially in a violent conflict environment. They trust each other in very important 
ways. A cell is a form of purposeful, cohesive subgroup very much like an all-channel 
clique, with one or very few connections to the rest of the mechanism or network in 
which it is embedded.  
2. Network Mechanisms 
Mechanisms are social networks with deliberate routines–sequences of exchanges 
and systemic processes–that require contributions above the individual level and deliver 
information, services, or resources from an outside source to the interior or functional 
membership of a larger network. A mechanism is a chain or larger group of nodes or cells 
with a unique capability which it regularly executes. An example is a supply chain, or 
logistics mechanism, that reaches from deep within the core of a network to the outside 
world where the resources it acquires originate. Properly governed mechanisms also 
differ from cells or other cohesive subgroups in that there are structural measures 
employed throughout a mechanism to maintain a balance between synchronization and 
security, as well as control and efficiency. 
Mechanisms also respond to demand signals at the parent network end, are 
dependent upon both the larger network at the demand end and their external sources at 
the supply end, and must negotiate for fair exchanges at both ends. Mechanisms may be 
considered networks in their own right, depending upon the level of analysis being 
conducted, and embedded in their surrounding network neighborhood by deliberate 
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representation at key points. Mechanisms include multiple members and cells that are 
linked together but with structural holes built into the formations, either naturally-
occurring or deliberately. However, mechanisms are not all-channel networks with 
consistent Simmelian ties to ensure member compliance or agreement, and thus are also 
constructed with inherent vulnerabilities. Mechanisms will be discussed more in the 
following sections. 
The highest level of intervention is the network level. While networks are the 
largest social formation in social network theory, and some network theorists extend the 
network concept to the entire world.179  For purposes here, it suffices to say that 
networks are embedded within larger networks and merge together via shared 
membership. For future references within this thesis, the network is the highest level of 
analysis and consists of nodes, cells, and mechanisms. 
3. Intervention Methods 
Next, there are the four methods of intervention. All actions are contained within 
these four methods ranging from least to most intrusive: monitor, influence, eliminate and 
replace. The level of sophistication required to accomplish these methods varies 
according to the scale and sophistication of the security surrounding targeted network. A 
decision to monitor a node or portion of a network drives resources and planning to 
observe and collect any and all information concerning actions, intentions, plans, 
resources, capabilities and limitations of the targeted node or nodes. As it is the least 
intrusive method, monitoring a node may be most desirable and frequently applied. The 
is especially true when the node is a key player for information awareness in a network or 
part of a decision-making or critical asset delivery mechanism. It may provide some level 
of early warning of impending attacks or other intentions. 
Influencing a node offers a very wide range of options, from direct to indirect 
messaging or physical actions against members of the targeted node’s network 
neighborhood that could reliably cause the node to change behavior. All forms of 
communication and actions are available, depending on environmental constraints such 
as rules of engagement, international law, native development and technology, local 
culture, and local laws and customs. 
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Eliminating a node is the easiest to explain. Th  is is action to kill, capture, or 
otherwise remove a member from this network neighborhood. The effects of this removal 
may be partly informed by Borgatti’s Key Player measurements, but the analysis before-
hand ought to include the best estimates of who would replace the member to ensure the 
role or roles he played continue to benefit the network. 
Replacing a node is by far the most difficult and forces a group to assume the 
most risk. Replacement is taking the role and position of a targeted node in the network. 
Elimination is inherent, but must be conducted in a manner that allows for a specially 
designated and trained element to be accepted by the targeted network and operate in the 
missing node’s place. In trust-based dark networks, this is challenging to say the least. 
Yet, there are historical precedents for it that will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Organizations implementing these methods do so by determining the scale of the 
intervention, or choosing an intervention approach. 
4. Intervention Approaches 
The three approaches to intervention are based on the number of network 
members to be acted upon and the timing of those actions per iteration. The approaches 
are individual, segmental, and sequential-viral and are listed in increasing level of 
requisite synchronicity and risk to the desired outcome. The choice concerning type of 
intervention is informed by: 
1. The desired outcomes as articulated in the commander’s intent  
2. The amount of risk the command is willing to accept 
3. The demonstrated level of organizational flexibility and agility 
4. The assets and resources available and the ability to direct and 
synchronize them  
The chosen approach drives the sophistication and scale of intelligence collection, 
analysis, and operational planning, as well as understanding any associated 
contingencies. The individual approach means taking action to remove a single member 
from active participation in his role in the larger network functions. This type is the least 
intensive for intelligence collection, analysis and planning purposes. The segmental 
approach refers to taking action against a definable or bounded part of a network 
simultaneously, whether that segment is a cell, an entire mechanism, a range of brokers 
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that connect components of the network, key leadership members, or some other subset 
of the network. It requires a higher degree of synchronization than the individual 
approach to ensure that none of the intended members from the target set escape.   
The sequential-viral180 approach is a planned multi-iteration version of one or 
both of the other two approaches. This is a much more sophisticated approach than a 
single-iteration in that it requires organizational flexibility and agility in decision making, 
execution synchronicity, and contingency planning. There is a higher degree of risk 
because there is a greater chance of the later-targeted actors being alerted to their cohorts’ 
detention. 
5. Intervention Concept 
An intervention plan—actually an intervention concept—would include all three 
components: a level of targeting, an action type, and an approach.   An example concept 
is: we will conduct a segmental elimination of all members of cell A, simultaneously with 
replacing their courier (individual member replacement) to the regional command cell 
with a recruited agent. One possible intended outcome from this operation is that an 
entire intelligence collection cell is arrested, plus their courier who delivers their written 
reports and other messages is arrested and replaced by an agent who can facilitate 
deception of the regional command cell by delivering false intelligence reports. 
Amplifying information such as monitoring the command cell to ensure they are unaware 
of the operation may also be included. If this operation is nested within a larger operation 
to influence the regional command cell by deception, then the concept would state so. 
Describing an intervention concept like this is intended to impart a basic understanding of 
the actions involved, against whom, and how it is to be carried out. The details of each 
intervention will be exhaustively described in the plan that follows from the concept, with 
the purpose of each action and how it connects to the larger purpose of the operation. The 
range of possible effects of a successful—and unsuccessful—mission outcome should 
also be described, based on the network analysis.*  
                                                 
* Currently, military doctrine only mandates description of the effects of a “most likely” and a “most 
dangerous” outcome.  Complexity demands admission of the possibility of a range of possible outcomes 
according to the effects associated with any operation. 
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While at first glance some permutations of the above would seem simpler than 
others, the best choice for any given situation lies in the quality of the data, the quality of 
the analysis of that data, and the soundness of the plan derived from that analysis. For 
example, eliminating an entire network that employs no security measures and is entirely 
mapped out and predictable from their routine activities may be far easier than replacing 
a critical node with a friendly agent within a family-based mechanism funneling weapons 
between trusted tribal areas. Thus, the former option may be a matter of timing more than 
complexity. In the case of the latter, the opacity and cohesion based on trust of the 
targeted node’s network neighborhood is much more of a factor. In this way, intervention 
difficulty can be a function of the locations of structural holes between the acting 
organization and target network. So, a solid understanding of the structures within a dark 
network is necessary to determine the best options for intervention. 
F. MECHANISMS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 
Mechanisms are specialized chains and groups of members that collectively 
accomplish a unique task or set of tasks routinely. Each member has a specific role or 
roles that he or she performs for the surrounding network neighborhood, such as leader, 
driver, foot soldier, courier, or bomb emplacer. Individual members may form cells as 
needed to accomplish more involved tasks. Or cells may become part of a dark network 
as a legacy structure borrowed from another social network, such as familial ties or other 
social groupings; the sources of recruits vary greatly. Mechanisms may also form either 
from an amalgamation of individuals or cells for specific purposes or from an intact 
system such as a legitimate private business turned into a front organization. Regardless, 
the social groupings known as cells and mechanisms have particular functions to perform 
with at least a minimal level of competence. As a role is to a network member, so a 
function is to a cell or mechanism within that network, so that functions are the tasks that 
mechanisms accomplish for the larger network. Depending on their size, purpose and 
environment, dark networks have seven basic functions that must be accomplished in 
order to survive. 
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The seven sufficient and necessary functions of clandestine networks are 1) 
leadership and decision making, 2) ideology and messaging, 3) operations, 4), 
intelligence 5), resourcing (acquisition, logistics, storage, and financing), 6) sanctuary, 
and 7) recruitment and training. If a particular dark network has a more specialized 
function overall, then other, more focused and specialized mechanisms may appear as 
subsets of the above list. It is also important to note that, as networks grow and take on 
larger memberships and seek to achieve greater objectives toward their overall goal, they 
go through processes of specialization and differentiation. Mechanisms may subdivide 
and the new departments focus their work to fulfill larger functions181 based on the 
uniqueness of tasks, technical difficulty of processes, geographic distribution, and the 
need for secrecy.182  There may be multiple examples of one kind of mechanism 
contained in or supporting a single operational network due to the above factors. 
Dark network mechanisms and their functions are interdependent, with some 
more central than others. Figure 25 shows the interconnected functions, with leadership 
& decision making, ideology, operations, and intelligence as the most central 
functions.183  The relations between the functions are only part of the story, however. 
The lines are connections between members, just as the cells and mechanisms that 
perform the functions are made of connected members. The various mechanisms attempt 




Figure 25. Dark network functions. Each outer function supports the inner functions 
structurally and conceptually. Graphic by the author. 
G. ESTIMATED NETWORK REACTIONS TO INTERVENTION 
Mechanisms embedded within networks are networks themselves. The members 
of a mechanism send and receive signals from their network neighborhood just as any 
other social network. What has not been discussed in sufficient detail, however, is a 
typology of the full range of responses available to a dark network to stimuli from the 
network neighborhood. Knowing the range of possible reactions provides a bounded set 
of effects that may be deduced and understood in terms of structure, centrality, cohesion, 
density, and other SNA concepts. Since dark networks will not behave in random ways 
when they detect intrusion or come under attack, their reactions can, theoretically, be 
predicted. They will behave within a bounded set of estimated* reactions. This is 
important because predictive analysis is critical to understanding the first, second, and 
                                                 
* The bounded set of reactions is only an estimate because of the three fundamental planning 
assumptions of dark network analysis (see chapter 4). 
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third order effects of network intervention, and what is needed to move the network in a 
favorable direction or at least see what you may have to deal with after intervention. The 
military’s current model of action-reaction-counteraction will suffice for a simple method 
of examining effects based on initial friendly force intervention.184 
Intervening against a dark network can have two primary effects on the network: 
structural and cognitive. A dark network’s reactions to external attack, or suspicion 
thereof, will have different effects on the membership depending on the intervention 
(level, method, and approach), network cohesiveness, and the countermeasures taken by 
the network as a whole or by significant portions of it. The actions of a member’s 
immediate network neighborhood will significantly impact that member’s sentiments and 
actions.185  Not only may the network’s structure of relationships change (structural 
changes), but the quality of those relationships and sentiments may change (cognitive 
changes). Thus, not only the intervention, but the reaction and counteractions will have 
both structural and cognitive effects on the network. The goal of intervention is to 
maximize the negative impact of both types of effect. The goal of the target network is to 
limit the structural and cognitive damage caused by intervention and reduce risk of 
further compromise by making structural changes that improve security and effectiveness 
that also maximize favorable cognitive impact.  
1. Structural Reactions to Intervention 
Structural effects are changes to the membership and relationships between 
members. The cognitive effects are characterized by favorable or unfavorable impacts on 
members’ levels of trust, perceptions of uncertainty, and morale. Unfavorable cognitive 
impacts include decreased trust with current or new local network neighborhood 
members, increased perception of uncertainty and lowered morale.    
Initial conditions are very important to the quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
of changes and patterns across the network under analysis. These conditions refer to 
circumstances both internal and external to the network at the earliest time of discovery. 
Obviously, this is problematic when discussing dark networks, and the information 
available at the time of intervention will have to suffice for initial conditions in order to 
measure changes due to intervention. The internal conditions include as many of the 
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qualities of social networks as may be measured: strengths of ties, centrality, density, 
positions and roles, size and relations of cohesive subgroups, and number of triads. 
Bridging the internal and external are the relationships that connect the network to its 
network environment. External conditions include environmental factors such as 
similarity of the dark network to the local (open) population, homogeneity of the local 
population, availability of resources to the network for exploitation, technological 
development of the surrounding region, and the popular legitimacy and skill of the local 
authorities to influence relevant segments of the population. 
Two further assumptions are necessary to explore theoretical network effects. 
First, the network is assumed to correctly perceive and disseminate internally the 
intended signals from the outside by the individual senders, including an intervening 
organization. This will attempt to hold constant cognitive and organizational biases and 
other filters that screen out important information, except for when creating these 
problems is part of the intended outcomes of an intervention. The second assumption is 
that all network members are action-oriented, as indicated by their membership, and 
pressure their leadership to continue action via their routine interactions. This assumption 
attempts to eliminate membership apathy or disenfranchisement for reasons other than 
the effects of intervention. However, these factors cannot be held constant in real life 
unless the network locations of these conditions are known to exist and the planned 
intervention is intended to exploit those very dynamics already at work. 
The structural impacts are categorized by consolidating effects and dispersing 
effects, which are decisions or actions to expand or contract the direct control or 
influence of the core of the network relative to the size of the network and scope of 
operations. In other words, the network core is consolidating power if they take actions to 
expand direct control by either shrinking pathways to desired nodes outside the core or by 
exerting dramatic constraints over the conduct of operations. Conversely, the core 
disperses power structurally by allowing the network to expand without shortening 




distances through some form of reorganization. Operationally, the core disperses power 
by allowing subordinates autonomy of action through independent decision making and 
resource control.   
2. Cognitive Reactions to Intervention 
The ability to influence the core of a network to change structure of functional 
norms is dependent upon the network’s ability to correctly perceive outside signals and 
communicate internally. Cognitive impacts are valued as to the benefit or hazard to the 
mission created by the psychological and emotional impact of a structural change upon 
the affected members. These effects will impact the individual level as members’ stress 
levels, trust, and productivity are influenced by their network neighborhood. These 
impacts also apply at the group level as members change their relationships and the 
quantity and quality of their interactions—thus altering the flow of information, capital, 
and resources across mechanisms within the larger network. Cognitive reactions to 
structural changes will be according to known and unknown numerous and likely 
contradictory factors influencing the opinions and habits of the membership. It should 
also be noted that repeated abuse, misuse, or misinterpretation of signals across the 
network can create negative outcomes of any of the structural reactions, even if they are 
done with the best intentions of the network core or middle-management. So, while 
predictions are approximations at best (and wild guesses most likely), the cumulative 
impact of total cognitive effects on structural change needs to be accounted for or 
assumed to be constant according to a useful framework that helps guide analysis and 
planning. Figure 26 is an experimental framework in that direction. 
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Figure 26. Network status reactions to external stimuli distributed across scales of 
structural and cognitive effects. Generally, the goal of intervention is to maximize the 
unfavorable impacts according to how the intervening organization wants to terminate the 
end game against the network. 
3. Consolidating Effects 
Consolidating effects increase the level of direct control of the network by 
bringing members closer together, limiting exposure to external influence, reducing or re-
orienting operations, shedding the more peripheral members, or increasing active 
membership by recruitment to active mechanisms already under direct control. 
Consolidation also brings additional stresses of increased numbers of direct reports with 
all the burdens of responsibility for more members and their actions. Indeed, while all 
structural effects may possess some degree of positivity and negativity, they are valued 
here according to the likely dominant attribute. 
Consolidating structural reactions include activation, promotion, reinforcement, 
recruitment, insulation, re-posturing, and censure. Also included is a deliberate decision 
to continue operations called operational continuation. The first four reactions have 
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mostly positive cognitive effects as they are in-line with the members’ need for action 
while the remaining three denote mostly negative cognitive impact. 
Activation occurs when inactive members of the network are re-structured into the 
remainder of cells and mechanisms currently functioning, or re-introduced as a newly 
formed cell or mechanism. Activation is performed according to a plan developed prior to 
de-activation. Agents who are technically members of the network, but are inactive, are 
often referred to as “sleeper agents” or members of “sleeper cells.” 
Promotion is when an active member or members are elevated in status over their 
peers and perhaps re-assigned to lead a different group of members. Structurally, this is a 
consolidating effect because the elevated position means they are closer to the core, if not 
now a member of it. 
Reinforcement is re-aligning the network structures accompanying specific 
functions (members, cells or mechanisms) to support another similar or related function 
to ensure success of the latter. This is a consolidating effect because these supporting 
structures are now under the direct control of a primary effort of the network. 
Recruitment is mobilizing new members or co-opting other organizations into the 
network’s greater span of control. Recruitment can also have a dispersing effect if the 
new members are given a high level of autonomy in resource control and decision 
making. 
Insulation is individual members reducing their contact with the outside world 
(building structural holes) and requires widespread action to merely protect the network, 
rather than fulfilling the purpose of the network, which forces members to decide to sever 
non-essential ties to non-members. A severe form of insulation may be a deliberate 
process of going underground or severing all non-network ties (even with family), similar 
to the process that members of the Weather Underground underwent when they split from 
the Students for a Democratic Society organization in 1969.186 This form of insulation 
can be resource-intensive and expensive.   
Re-posturing is significant restructuring of roles, positions, and joining structures 
between members, cells and mechanisms and likely includes severing long-standing 
strong ties, and forcing subordination of members to others between whom there is not a 
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consistent level of trust. In the same light as an adhocracy, destructive change can be very 
emotionally destabilizing and creates enormous challenges for moral cohesion, trust or 
continuation of social norms within the group. 
Censure includes all forms of punishments (except for demotion) where the 
member being punished remains under the control and employment of the network.   
In network analysis measurements of consolidating actions, some combination of 
the following may occur: the network increases in size; the average individual member 
“reach” (centrality measures) increases; the number of extra-network strong ties 
decreases, while the number of weakening ties increases; the number of structural holes 
protecting the network increases (inversely with the number of direct connections to 
external resources and information sources) the number of pairs and triads increases; the 
number of components decreases; and density increases.  
The idea of forcing changes in networks  is to create improvements or degradation 
of CARVER characteristics such as reduced criticality via redundant communications, 
reduced vulnerability due to the conforming impact of new Simmelian ties, improved 
recuperability (via increased instances of structural equivalence) and  insulation leading 
to reduced vulnerability. Some structural changes will benefit some aspects of the 
network’s purpose. Others may cause the network to suffer, such as increased 
vulnerability due to fewer structural holes between cells and mechanisms (less 
compartmentation) and could lead to compromise of sensitive information and leaks to 
the outside world. In this way, individual changes could have both positive and negative 
impact, perhaps simultaneously. 
4. Dispersing Effects 
Dispersing effects occur when the core of a network seeks to relieve itself of the 
stresses of managing a network by relinquishing varying levels of control over some or 
all subordinate mechanisms. This may occur for several reasons: the network may have 
grown too large and unwieldy for centralized control, because of a sudden change of 
environmental pressures, because network leadership senses a loss of purpose, or in 
response to a suspected security compromise. Structural reactions with dispersing effects 
include withdrawal, deactivation, dissolution, demotion, escape, and sequestration. Of 
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these, only withdrawal has the potential of carrying affirming emotion as it indicates a 
pre-planned scheme of physical removal of network members from one geographical area 
to another with the intent of resuming operations upon re-establishment in the new area.   
The remaining reactions have some level of negative connotation because they are 
understood to mean separation from the action, trust, satisfaction and assurances of the 
main body of the network with increasing levels of duress.   
Deactivation means a portion of the network is to be shut down for an unknown 
duration, with a re-activation plan known and rehearsed, and likely without duress other 
than the necessity for secrecy.   
Dissolution is deactivation of an entire mechanism or the network as a whole 
without re-activation planning; duress level is undetermined.   
Demotion is an individual condition of losing status in the network but remaining 
active, though a group may feel the consequences along with the demoted member (such 
as a cell feeling an emotional blow due to their leader’s demotion).   
Escape is to depart a geographical region under severe duress. The physical 
displacement may be according to an escape or “bug out” plan, but entails some level of a 
loss of direct control and communication. The network as a whole may not be likely to 
re-convene intact due to the loss of some or many members in the process of escaping. 
Withdrawal is a more controlled form of departure. 
Sequestration is a protective measure taken by the majority of a network to 
insulate itself from a smaller component of the network under duress based entirely on 
the perception of security compromise or a schism of ideology or other form of divisive 
competition. This may be a temporary or permanent condition, to be determined by the 
network core. A sequestered portion of a network can be re-validated by a series of tests, 
pursuant to an investigation, or by re-claiming allegiances depending upon the nature of 
the crisis that led to sequestration in the first place. 
5. Operational Changes 
Changes in the conduct of operations–what the network is supposed to be doing–
are considered structural because the actions of the members, cells and mechanisms are 
the structure in motion. In a dynamic environment, static information is nearly irrelevant, 
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as are unused materials, funds, and people. While maintaining a reserve is important for 
buffering the peaks and valleys in availability of resources or other environmental 
constraints, the purpose of the network is presumed to be change, radical change. Change 
requires action. 
Changes in activity between members are changes in the structure and flow of the 
network. These mechanics include employment of trust—the flow of social capital—and 
the flow of information and resources. In total, there are four choices of operational 
directive available to network leaders: continuation, re-orientation, expansion, and 
freeze.*  Operational continuation is to maintain the status quo—members keep doing 
what members desire to do by virtue of their decision to become members in accordance 
with leadership decisions and resource availability. Operational expansion is to multiply 
the members, cells and mechanisms dedicated to certain operations by re-arranging 
membership or improving efficiencies in structural distribution or resources. However, 
operational re-orientation and operational freezes have negative cognitive association 
because they pull members off their patterns of normal operations, thus increasing stress 
and perhaps diminishing trust between themselves and their superiors. This is especially 
acute in operational freezes as members sit idle, and perhaps go off in search of 
meaningful work with other illicit groups, or even seek employed in the open market and 
leave their previous dark network associations for good. 
In a final word about structural change options, consolidating and dispersing 
effects that look the same structurally can be for offensive or defensive purposes. For an 
offensive example, a network may prepare for expanding operations by splitting a 
mechanism into two separate mechanisms with unique command and control structures 
(i.e.: creating two separate attack cells by either time, or space, or both.). Or, defensively, 
network leadership may split a mechanism in order to sequester only a portion of it due to 
inefficiencies, ideological disagreements or suspected security compromises in order to 
preserve the remaining network. In the event of a structural change without much other 
                                                 
* Initiation is also an operational choice, but this presumes no action precedes the analysis.  This thesis 
assumes a targeted network is already functions, as that is what brought the network to our attention. 
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indication of the purpose, observers will have to look elsewhere across the network for 
corroborating indictors of intentions.   
H. SUMMARY 
SONAP uses concepts common to the Special Forces target analysis CARVER 
tool and SNA to identify and estimate structural patterns and changes in dark networks. 
The template used to estimate a basic structure includes seven mechanisms that range 
from the very core decision making structures to the outer-most recruitment and resource 
mobilization structures. The six aspects of CARVER have commonalities with SNA 
concepts as well as other, related concepts such as geospatial, temporal and cognitive 
characteristics used in other approaches to disrupting dark networks. SONAP also 
prescribes four methods of intervention, with three intervention approaches to affect 
changes in network structure and operations. Those changes are measured according to 
consolidating or dispersing structural changes and positive or negative cognitive effects 
upon network membership. Naturally, the goal of intervention against a dark network will 
include maximizing disruption to internal processes by influencing it to make structural 
and operational changes that reduce operational synchronization and maximize negative 
cognitive impact. To explore an example of implementing SONAP against a target 
network, Chapter VI is comprised of strategy development and intervention against 
Noordin Mohammed Top’s Islamic terror network in Indonesia, based on a 2006 open-
source dataset.  
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VI. ATTACKING NOORDIN’S NETWORK: APPLYING SONAP 
 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE DATASET 
What follows is an example application of SONAP-based analysis and 
intervention strategy of an open-source dataset from International Crisis Group, “an 
independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation [sic]”187 that produces reports 
concerning various crisis areas around the world. The dataset is one that describes some 
members and relationships that constituted Noordin Mohammed Top’s hybrid Jema’at 
Islamiyah terror network that attacked high-profile Western civilian targets in Jakarta and 
Bali from 2002–2005. Those attacks killed hundreds and caused severe damage not just 
to the intended targets that included hundreds of Westerners and other club-goers at 
hotels and nightclubs, but also to the credibility of the Indonesian authorities.188  The 
availability of these data and the public record of Indonesian law enforcement and 
military operations against this network provide an accessible discussion concerning the 
ends, ways and means of intervening against dark networks. This chapter is a discussion 
of strategy, desirable and attainable end states, and the work within SONAP that goes 
into operationalizing the strategy to achieve success. This chapter concludes with one 
possible strategy to move toward solving the two essential problems the Indonesian 
government faces in this particular case study. Those problems are substantial gaps in 
security sector effectiveness and Noordin Top’s violent jihadist terror organization 
operating and conducting attacks within its sovereign territory. 
B. INITIAL STRATEGIC CHOICES 
Intervening against dark networks requires a fundamental choice of which overall 
strategy or strategies will be employed against the systems which the network exploits or 
controls. One of those strategic choices includes decisions as to whether or not to employ 
kinetic methods, non-kinetic methods or a combination of the two.189  Top factors 
influencing this choice are international laws and treaties, host nation laws, U.S. laws 
governing the authorities granted by relevant policies, and the practicalities of ends, ways 
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and means in military operations.*  Diplomatically speaking, it may be in the United 
States’ best interest to abide by existing laws or agreements with the larger community of 
nations, even at the expense of short term tactical successes or operational simplicity, 
unless specific laws or exceptions can be granted by host nations† or supportive third 
country leadership.190 But the host nation may be unable or unwilling to intervene or to 
allow others to intervene within its borders. The host nation may even be more or less 
compliant with the dark networks contained within its borders. Thus, from a theoretical 
perspective, all options are on the table. Figure 27 displays the range of options available 
supportive of both sides of that decision. 
 
Figure 27. The range of strategic options supportive of kinetic and non-kinetic 
approaches adapted from work by Roberts and Everton191  and Everton.192 
Kinetic methods include missions intended to result in death or capture of targeted 
network members, typically known as “kill or capture” missions, or destruction of 
materials, equipment or facilities. The desired outcomes from kinetic operations tend to 
be immediate, with second and third order consequences of less direct interest. Kinetic 
operations can be executed unilaterally or by/with a host nation or third party agency 
under U.S. direction. There are numerous factors that impact those decisions and the 
overall effort may require a combination of several of the above options to meet the 
requirements of the United States, the host nation and concerned third parties. 
                                                 
* The environmental constraints of some locations may prohibit one or more methods, or any overt 
operating of any kind, thus forcing decisions to be made regarding risk of compromise and its impact upon 
perceptions of U.S. legitimacy and risk of violations of the terms of international alliances. 
 
† Here, host nations are the countries in which the targeted dark network resides. 
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Kinetic targeting is only part of the overall kinetic story. The other part is creating 
or developing the capacity of the local law enforcement apparatus or counter-terror or 
counterinsurgent military or paramilitary units resident in the government most 
responsible for the dark network problem. All these entities will be referred to as the host 
nation’s security apparatus. In the case of a willing but incompetent host nation security 
apparatus, the U.S. may choose to undertake an extensive program to improve the 
capabilities of a host nation’s security forces, domestic intelligence agencies and judicial 
system.193  Even then, a foreign nation may still require more direct assistance. However, 
if the host nation proves unwilling to intervene against a resident dark network enemy, 
then a willing third party–an irregular force–may be an acceptable option to attack the 
targeted dark network.194  This third party may belong to another nation’s security forces, 
or constitute an altogether non-attributable, irregular force not adhering to any nation’s 
foreign policy or security apparatus. This same third party may also demonstrate a limited 
capability to carry out its intentions, and so may also require some level of capacity 
building from the U.S. or another party. However, in terms of international norms and 
laws, the concept of developing and applying a non-attributable third party to this kind of 
work is a troublesome choice, fraught with potentially damaging blowback.   
Aside from kinetic operations, there is another path. Non-kinetic methods include 
institution building, psychological operations, information operations, rehabilitation and 
reintegration, and intelligence monitoring. These range from military or military-like 
capabilities to domestic intelligence collection and operations to decidedly non-military 
agencies and international institutions collaborating in host nation domestic civil society 
development.   In some cases, an improved range of host nation and indigenous 
institutions has been able to blunt the extremist ideologies and offer alternative messages 
to vulnerable audiences and pools of available recruits.195 
To explain, institution building is “creation of governance capacities…[and] 
entails the dismantling and reformation of old organizations and institutions–legal, 
administrative, economic as well as social–the improvement of efficiency and 
effectiveness of existing institutions, the restoration of destroyed institutions and the 
enhancement of authorities’ professionalism.”196  Psychological and information 
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operations are social and technical approaches to inform and influence mass audiences 
and targeted actors to shape perceptions and institute behavioral changes197 such as 
dissuading violent attitudes or inducing uncertainty or distrust into a group’s 
cohesiveness. Rehabilitation and reintegration are methods of taking responsibility for re-
inclusion of known extremists into non-violent society and coaching and mentoring their 
way back into mainstream life.198  Lastly, intelligence monitoring is a broad range of 
activities involving all-source intelligence collection and analysis and paying attention to 
host nation domestic and international dialog and broadcast and print media for 
indications of progress of efforts to moderate extremist ideologies and tamp down levels 
of violence. For my purposes here, I also include intelligence operations as a part of 
monitoring. Intelligence operations are “tasks undertaken…to obtain information and 
satisfy validated [intelligence] requirements”199 and can be quite complex operations in 
their own right. It must also be noted that many activities within different parts of a host 
nation society–and different activities within the same sectors of society–will have their 
own unique levels of access and placement. Thus, every operation within every line of 
effort that is part of the overall intervention campaign can be used for its intelligence 
collection value. Everything contributes to the total analysis picture. 
C. COMMENCING SONAP ANALYSIS 
Analysis of a dark network and how it relates to its environment starts with a set 
of working hypotheses that prescribe further information necessary to start the opening 
phases of intervention.200  Figure 28, from the end of chapter 4, can assist in the 
development of initial information requirements, given some level of information about 
the target network. If existing information does not suffice for good analysis, given 
Krebs’ assumptions, then further refined information requirements, or IRs, must be 
developed and coordinated with collection assets. It is with this framework that we begin 
analysis and intervention against Noordin Mohammed Top’s dark network in Indonesia. 
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Figure 28. Introduced in Chapter IV, the threat network intervention decision tree can 
assist in the initial formulation of hypotheses to begin analysis. 
D. CASE STUDY: NOORDIN’S TERROR NETWORK 
Indonesian authorities killed Noordin Mohammed Top in September, 2009. Prior 
to then, he formed an effective terror network from a collection of members of different 
Islamic extremist and traditional Indonesian insurgent organizations. The most notable of 
was Jema’ah Islamiyah, or JI, which has ties to the Arab core of the al-Qaeda network in 
Afghanistan dating back to the days of jihadist resistance to the Soviet occupation. The 
United Nations added JI to its list of organizations and individuals connected to Al-Qaida 
in 2002.201  The overall hybrid network that Noordin formed included members of 
numerous other Islamist organizations, but also followed familial ties, relations between 
business associates, and friendships between school mates dating back more than a 
decade.202  The resulting analysis of these relationships and interactions culminated in 
the datasets that form the root for this chapter’s case study. The remainder of this chapter 
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relies heavily upon the 2006 International Crisis Group document Asia Report No 114 
Terrorism In Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks. The derived datasets are also sourced 
entirely from this same document, referred to as ICG or ICG sources throughout the 
remainder of the chapter. Some limitations of this dataset prevent full analysis of the 
network as described in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Here, this fact is considered part of the 
inherent difficulty of intelligence collection and imperfect information about dark 
networks. 
Figure 29 depicts the structure of Noordin’s Network as derived from the ICG 
documentation as of May 5, 2006. All 79 known members of the fullest membership of 
the network are depicted. The column of 9 isolates adjacent to the photo of Noordin 
depicts known network members, but whose direct links to the main component of the 
network are unknown. The members and relationships depicted are a 2006 snapshot and, 
for our purposes, considered the current state of the network. The environmental situation 
surrounding the network is absent from the graph. However, according to the 2006 ICG 
sources, the network at that time appeared to be “running short of money and experienced 
cadres,” there was a loss of resources for ideological consultation, Noordin himself was 
on the run, and there were few trained members who could continue their work without 
significant assistance. Much of the core of Noordin’s network remains at-large, though 
overall network attrition is very high. The further determination is that the pre-existing 
networks Noordin drew upon—JI membership and the school networks—will continue to 
serve as sources of potential recruits. The ICG also notes Noordin’s distinct preference 
for reaching out to small groups who have decided to go it alone. This is the attitude 
Noordin himself appears to have taken and may play significantly into a future strategy 




Figure 29. Noordin Mohammed Top, leader of the network depicted and responsible 
for terrorist attacks in Indonesia, 2003–05. Noordin’s place in the network is depicted by 
the large red circle in the middle.203 
The four infamous attacks perpetrated by Noordin’s followers between 2003 and 
2005 brought pursuit and punishment for network members and the resulting attrition 
from military and law enforcement operations against them have taken their toll (see the 
surviving membership in  Figure 30). By 2006, nearly 70% of the total documented 
membership had been either killed or detained, with several receiving substantial prison 
sentences. The remaining 24 members are highly fragmented into several components, 
most of which are isolates as far as the data indicates, perhaps indeed isolated from one 
another. There is one main component containing several of Noordin’s key associates 
with Noordin himself remaining the most central figure. For our purposes here, this is the 
set of initial conditions which set the stage for analysis of changes and development of an 
intervention strategy.   Within these initial conditions, there are some aspects of this data 
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that are significant to an analyst looking to answer the first few questions on the network 
intervention decision tree.  
 
Figure 30. The main component of the current surviving 24-member network, 
dramatically reduced by attrition due to Indonesian kinetic targeting. This remaining core 
has proven elusive and, without intervention, resurgence is likely as Noordin reaches out 
to new recruiting pools.  
1. Network State 
Question 1. Is the network in a state that makes intervention necessary?   
Presuming the Indonesian and regional authorities desire to bring the leaders of 
this terror organization to justice and to prevent further attacks, yes intervention is 
necessary. Remembering that Noordin’s network was not a casual collection of jihadist 
groups and Islamic insurgencies, but that Noordin himself purposefully stitched the group 
together through trusted prior contacts—strong and weak ties—predominantly from 
Islamic schools, prior jihad experiences, and familial and friendship ties. Those strong 
ties are composed of trust and energy in motion; and in the weak ties lay network-
expanding potential. That same potential exists today as it did before the first attacks in 
2002, but with the added attraction of recent success in waging violent jihad against icons 
of perceived Western influence and decadence. Action-seeking individuals will gravitate 
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to a group that exemplifies their ethos; thus the network will likely grow again. In 
retrospect, not only was it possible that Noordin’s network would re-constitute and 
resume acts of violence, it did.204 
2. Information Availability 
Question 2. Is there enough of the right information to determine a course of 
 action? 
 
We have information concerning the past and current network structure, we know 
some of the manner in which the network was partly dismantled, and from that we have a 
notion of what is missing from the earlier, unimpaired network. Using the dark network 
mechanisms and functions framework provided in Chapter V, we can identify some of 
the now defunct systems within his network and some of the systems in which Noordin’s 
network was and is embedded. There is limited information about the macro- and meso-
networks between groups and external entities directly related to Noordin’s network, and 
a fair amount of information about the tactical level of network membership, 
relationships and activities. Analysis of those levels of interaction reveals the social 
systems which jihadists such as Noordin create and maintain for their cause. 
3. An analysis of Noordin’s network neighborhood: the inter-
 organizational level 
Noordin assembled his network from a wide variety of backgrounds, particularly 
exploiting several jihadist organizations and schools. Figures SSS and TTT illustrate the 
interlocking associations of several entities that served at the strategic level to maintain 
the health of the jihadist economy of South and SE Asia. Noordin and many of his 
contacts also drew upon these organizations for recruitment of new members via trusted 
pre-existing relationships. These groups ranged from formal, western universities to 
jihadist camps-for-kids-turned-madrasas to well-established ethno-religious armed rebel 
groups and terrorist organizations with histories and narratives all their own. Further 
investigation of these institutions reveals opportunities and vulnerabilities for both 
Noordin and the Indonesian government. 
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These institutions are similar in that the new recruits and resources came via 
vetted and trusted sources, though not always native to Noordin’s network. Many had 
their bona fides confirmed via family or friendship ties that went back years—including 
roots as varied as childhood pals or prior combat experience in places like Afghanistan. 
The jihadist organizations have focused on creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia and 
the whole of Oceania (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, southern Thailand and 
southern Philippines).205  The schools are focused on education and indoctrination for the 
very long term outcome of multi-generational mobilization. In Noordin’s experience, 
drawing heavily from complimentary institutions has paid off. 
 
Figure 31. Noordin’s network neighborhood at the group level. Node size indicates 
degree centrality: the larger the symbol the higher the relative degree centrality. Link 
thickness indicates the relative amount of mobility of membership between organizations. 
Note the multiple entities that share JI lineage or subordination. 
 The adults that came from the meso-level inter-organizational networks came 
with a wide range of experiences that fed into the health of Noordin’s organization. 
Figure 31 shows that the primary organizations that fed Noordin’s network were JI, al-
Qaida, and two older, traditional Islamist groups: KOMPAK and Darul Islam. Some of 
 103 
the other groups depicted—Mantiqi I, II, and III and Ring Banten—are actually 
administrative or geographical divisions of JI, and JI itself is an historical off-shoot of 
Darul Islam.206  That means that there are long-standing ties between organizations 
beyond just membership mobility. 
 Many members of Noordin’s network traced their ideological lineage via shared 
mechanisms such as combat or school attendance and some came to value the new 
attachments over their previous relationships. In so doing, they demonstrated altered 
loyalties–re-directed trust–to their new organization over their previous attachments. A 
post-Marriott bombing episode with Toni Togar exemplifies this: getting cold feet as he 
stored all the left over explosives at his house, Togar chose to call Noordin to tell him 
that he was going to “throw them out” rather than his immediate JI supervisor. While the 
ICG documentation does not explain why this happened, the implication is that Noordin’s 
action-oriented ethos drew higher levels of trust than the prior long-standing 
relationships.207  Many of those interlocking relationships are depicted in Figure 32. 
So, we have not only determined that some sort of JI or other Islamist credentials 
are a must for anyone seeking to enter Noordin’s network or to associate with its 
members, but also that infiltration of one group may enable infiltration of others, 
including Noordin’s. We also know that individual choices by dually-employed members 
in mechanisms shared between more than one network can disrupt one organization’s 
control over the mechanisms and the members of it. This is the essence of principal-




Figure 32. A graph of all of the interlocking associations across Noordin’s jihadist 
economy in Indonesia. Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda, Darul Islam, KOMPAK and the JI 
subsidiary Ring Banten are the largest contributors of members to Noordin’s operations 
and supporting mechanisms. Organizations are represented by red boxes, members are 
blue circles. 
Not all schools are equal when it comes to contributions specific to Noordin’s 
campaign. Figure 33  illustrates that Pondok Ngruki (al-Mukmin) and Luqmanul Hakeim 
are the primary feeder schools for membership in Noordin’s endeavor. Two other schools 
of note are the Universitas an-Nur and University of Technology of Malaysia. Noordin 
himself was a product of the University of Technology and Luqmanul Hamkeim. 
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Figure 33. A graph of the Islamic school associations within Noordin’s network. 
Pondok Ngruki and Luqmanul Hakeim were particularly instrumental in providing 
indoctrinated graduates into the jihadist economy in SE Asia and Oceania. Schools are 
represented by red boxes, members are blue circles. 
Again we see that membership mobility is a useful perspective in that these 
institutions can feed into one another. Students in school graduate and join the adult 
organizations, and those adult organizations send skilled members to be teachers and 
mentors at the schools. This sort of mobility may provide an in-road into the Indonesian 
insurgent-terror economy, as long as there is enough of a perception of the right kind of 
biographical history to support placement in what may be otherwise privileged tutelage. 
That sort of capability demands special agent selection criteria and development. And, 
despite the fact that a child would never be suspected of being an intelligence agent in a 




Table 2. The centrality scores of the Islamic schools. Centrality scores for the 
Pondok Ngruki school, the Universitas an-Nur and Luqmanul Hakeim school indicate a 
starting point for where to focus intelligence collection (monitoring), institution building, 
psychological operations and information operations (from Roberts and Everton, 2011). 
Roberts’ and Everton’s208 analysis of the Indonesian-based meso-networks 
between members of Noordin’s network and the Islamic schools they attended (Table 2) 
provides focus and insight into the recruitment and ideology mechanisms. Still, a full 
CARVER analysis of the schools that contribute to violent jihadist narratives is not 
possible due to lack of information that relates the various schools to one another. 
Analysis of the trust networks between network members and the geo-spatial basis of 
their relationships highlights the centrality of Islamic schools in their recruitment and 
ideological experiences. In Noordin’s case, the Muslim schools were critical to the future 
structure of trust and social capital for his network.   
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Figure 34. Densities of relationships within different types of historical ties between 
members of Noordin’s network. The school ties have been critical to the internal 
cohesion of Noordin’s network (from Roberts and Everton, 2011). 
From Figure 34, we see that school ties have played a significant role in the 
formation, ideology and unity for Noordin’s network. The tight web of connections 
between members based on school ties is not reflected anywhere else. Thus, the data 
about school attendance provides a basis for describing the meso-networks between 
individuals and between groups. Further analysis of the meso-network of Islamic schools, 
also completed by Roberts and Everton, reveals that three schools played significantly 
greater roles in the growth of the network. As shown in figure NNN, the Pondok Ngruki, 
Universitas an-Nur and Luqmanul Hakeim schools are at or near the top of most 
measures of centrality. We now have two focus areas for consideration for intervention. 




likely retain contacts outside of Indonesia. Further analysis of those ties reveals a larger 
pool of points of entry to Noordin’s network, but none as clear as the school and 
organizational ties. 
In summary, understanding Noordin’s network neighborhood gives insight into 
the mechanisms of recruiting, resourcing, sanctuary and intelligence collection. A holistic 
view of the structure and relational dynamics at work in the network’s external 
environment—its network neighborhood—is just as important as understanding those 
aspects of its internal operating structure and environment. Now that we understand some 
of the context of Noordin’s embeddedness in his environment, we look inside his 
operating world. 
4. Assessing the Damage: A Functional-Loss Analysis of Noordin’s 
 Network 
As of 2006, all of seven dark network functions are severely damaged. Some 
functions which we know were still at a partial level of functionality are leadership, 
sanctuary, and recruiting. We know that these were in some semblance of working order 
because Noordin and what remained of his core membership were successfully hiding 
and trying to reconstitute the organization. However, there were indications that the other 
functions (ideology, operations, intelligence, and resourcing) were diminished to the 
point of non-functionality or may not have been functioning at all in order to preserve 
those capabilities for later use. In fact, they have all been greatly diminished, presuming 
that the available data is representative of the real situation.   
An analysis of what remains of the various functions will highlight some useful 
aspects of the network’s current state and associated opportunities for counterterrorism 
efforts. There are two parts to this functional-loss damage assessment. The quantitative 
assessment indicates the numerical comparisons of what exists now to what existed in the 
fully-functioning network. A percentage of the former capability is used as an indicator 
of effectiveness. The other side of the coin is the qualitative assessment, which requires a 
much more in-depth look at more variables per member:  the individual roles of members 
within the mechanisms, their total commitments to roles in multiple mechanisms or roles 
within the same mechanism, previous experiences and training, length of time in the role 
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and position in the mechanism, and robustness of range of options for resources in that 
role. Other aspects of the member’s experience may be unique to that person’s experience 
or background.   
One structural hole theoretical approach to this depth of analysis is that the 
heavier workloads will require more experience and more options for resources (fewer 
structural holes between the member and resources necessary). If a member has multiple 
roles in multiple mechanisms (too few structural holes) and member attrition in one or 
more mechanisms occurs, then task overload may lead to exhaustion and the mechanism 
may shut down temporarily until tasks can be re-distributed, or be lost altogether. 
Obviously, Noordin and his subordinates want to avoid that at all costs, and this may be 
exploitable by counter-terror agencies. 
 
Figure 35. Losses to the network overall were severe, but attrition of assets available 
to certain mechanisms were nearly total. Leadership remains the most intact mechanism, 
but most others were made completely ineffective in supporting terror operations of the 
scale seen in 2005. 
In the quantitative analysis, the most basic comparison is what exists now as 
compared to what existed in a fully-functioning network. This analysis is broken down by 
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mechanism/function for better fidelity of systemic degradation. Figure 35 shows the net 
losses of each mechanism across Noordin’s network. Despite 70% recorded losses 
overall, Noordin’s leadership and operational mechanisms fared the best, with about 50% 
and 30% survival rates, respectively. Most other mechanisms are reduced to 
ineffectiveness due to attrition and loss of cohesion amongst the remaining at-large 
members. Obviously, the unknowable facts concerning who is in actual contact with 
whom and what they are able to accomplish together are many, but it is safe to say that 
severe damage to Noordin’s network was accomplished by 2006. Also, the fact that 
Noordin’s network has not been able to conduct any terrorist attacks in this current state 
gives strong indications that there are multi-functional dependencies at play. Even though 
there are more operational mechanism members surviving and at-large than any other two 
mechanism combined, the other mechanisms collectively cannot provide sufficient 
support to conduct operations. The task at hand now is to prevent any recurrence and 
continue to pursue the survivors until dead or brought to justice, or both. First, to better 
understand the capabilities, capacity and vulnerabilities that exist, we analyze what 
remains of the mechanisms. 
a. Leadership and decision making 
Leadership and decision making were still largely intact because Noordin 
and a few other mechanism members were still at large. Even though he lost many of his 
immediate subordinate leaders, such as Abdullah Sunata and Adung, Noordin is the 
creator and primary driver of the network and was seeking to expand his network to be at 
least as capable as it was before attrition. Figure 36 depicts the current core leadership 
situation as Noordin and only two other leaders or strategists, Abu Dujanah and 
Zulkarnaen, remain at large. However, exactly how Zulkarnaen collaborated with 
Noordin is hard to determine from the documentation. 
b. Ideology and messaging 
Bona fide experts in violent jihadist narratives from Jema’ah Islamiyah 
and other radical Islamist ideological sources are in short supply for Noordin.   Prior to 
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his arrest and receiving a death sentence, Ali Ghufron, aka Mukhlas, provided nearly all 
the jihadist literature and opinions for the inner group.209  He is now in jail, though not 
completely isolated from the outside world as Indonesian prisons are not known for their 
security.210  Noordin was searching for a new spiritual leader who can assist the members 
along their jihadist path. JI relied upon their own spiritual branding of jihad to 
differentiate them from the other Islamist groups in the region, and Noordin’s group was 
an off-shoot of JI.211 He may return to his JI contacts for another spiritual guide. 
 
Figure 36. Noordin’s 2006 ego net—all of his direct ties—reveals many lost 
members who were key to his campaign. Noordin remained at large with Abu Dujanah, 
the only other leader or strategist. The square nodes represent the incarcerated members; 
members who were free in 2006 are represented by circles. Red indicates a leadership or 
strategist role. 
c. Operations 
The operations mechanism fared moderately well through the period of 
attrition, retaining about one-third of its strength (31 members decreased to 10). Included 
in the operations mechanism are the members who actually conduct attacks, the 
instructors who trained fighters and suicide bombers, the bomb-makers, and limited 
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membership who performed multiple other operational support functions as couriers or 
transporters. As these men were the action arm of the network, they possessed no 
independent resourcing or sanctuary sub-systems of their own. As noted, there was some 
limited role-sharing with other mechanisms, but they are completely dependent upon 
those two mechanisms for the base of operational material supplies and safe havens in 
which to hide from the authorities, prepare for missions and recover from actions.   
d. Intelligence 
Of all the mechanisms, we have the least amount of information of 
members primarily employed in intelligence collection. There are a few of the actual 
attackers (operations mechanism) who also conducted their own reconnaissance and 
surveillance of targets and some recruiters also did some reconnaissance work, but 
information is sparse concerning those members whose primary purpose was to collect 
intelligence and provide it to Noordin or to the network as a whole. The one member 
assessed to be most uniquely concerned with target reconnaissance—Joni Achmed 
Fauzan—was sentenced to prison for six years.212  He had two assistants, but they are 
accounted for in other mechanisms (the aforementioned recruiters). Two of the chief 
ways to defeat reconnaissance and surveillance is to harden the target, conduct some kind 
of vetting of employees, and active surveillance countermeasures, thereby creating a 
paucity of information sources available to Noordin makes this task all the easier. 
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Figure 37. Noordin’s original network graph highlighting members associated with 
the weapons procurement function. The box-shaped nodes are those members who are 
incarcerated; the only remaining active member is Hari Kuncoro, represented by the 
circle-shaped node near the bottom of the graph. 
e. Resourcing 
Another severely diminished function is resourcing. Specifically, the 
weapons procurement function (Figure 37) is completely defunct, as are most of the 
financing cells (Figure 38). Often, the provider of materials was also the transporter and 
the one who maintained the explosives and weapons caches on their own property. This 
may have played a significant role in finding, arresting and prosecuting these multi-role 
supporters as—there may have been too few structural holes (too little compartmentation) 
of roles and functions. In manner of speaking, as the Indonesian authorities began to 
effectively counter the network and detain members based upon interrogations of 
previously detained members, any network member who took on too many different roles 
in different mechanisms became a liability instead of a multi-tasking asset. Consequently, 
 114 
when members like Purnama Putra, who had roles in three separate subsystems within the 
resourcing mechanism and direct relations with several other members who were all 
within one or two degrees of Noordin, his capture elevated personal and operational risk 
substantially. 
 
Figure 38. Members of the illicit financing sub-systems within the resourcing 
mechanism, by subsystem. This graph depicts all members who were full-time and part-
time involved in financing, according to the ICG documentation. The box-shaped nodes 
are those members who are incarcerated; the circles represent at-large members. The two 
“+” signs represent deceased members. 
f. Sanctuary 
The sanctuary mechanism is badly damaged. Of the 13 original members, 
only two remain at large. Because of the risk of a single catastrophic compromise of 
multiple members residing at one location, a robust mechanism of safe houses, caches, 
and other safe sites is a necessity. And, unless there is a large swath of terrain or urban 
area that remains ungoverned or controlled by the network or a patron of the network, 
then the safety of network members cannot be guaranteed without a deep bench of vetted 
and tested safe houses. Sanctuary systems are not designed with a 1:1 member-to-safe 
site ratio in mind, but rather the network of safe sites is supposed to be both deep and 
wide, so key network members are able to maintain some level of ambiguity as to their 
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location on any given night. So, as the covert network membership and material supply 
increases, so must the capacity of the sanctuary function. That means numbers of safe 
houses and safe house keepers and others who assist wittingly and unwittingly in the 
maintenance and support of a safe house must also increase. A safe house is not just an 
apartment in town; it is another layer of systems that must be carefully constructed and 
controlled within an agreeable network and physical neighborhood or with an enormous 
amount of energy spent maintaining a secure and consistent cover.213  This is not easily 
accomplished even by skilled and experienced managers—and failure to create a sound 
sub-network of safe site may have contributed to the success of the Indonesian authorities 
up to 2006 and afterward. Figure 39 illustrates the 2006 situation regarding the sanctuary 
function. All but two members of the network associated with safe houses are 
incarcerated.   
 
Figure 39. Noordin’s original network graph displaying the damage to the sanctuary 
function. All blue-colored members had a role in the sanctuary mechanism. The box-
shaped nodes are those members who are incarcerated; the only two remaining at-large 
are Chandra and Said Sungkar the circles. 
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In the final analysis, the tremendous losses incurred within the sanctuary 
and resourcing mechanism created huge structural holes and many new isolates. Over-
embeddedness—being a member of too many mechanisms simultaneously—may have 
contributed to the demise of some members. But Noordin is the chief exception to that 
idea: he was embedded in several mechanisms while chiefly playing the roles of 
strategist, decision maker and recruiter. He may well have learned from his mistakes and 
may consider building in better compartmentation as he re-builds his network; that is to 
say in network terms that he ought to build in more structural holes and other safeguards 
against compromise of brokers and gate keepers between cells and mechanisms.   
g. Recruitment. 
Significant recruitment occurred primarily by Noordin’s personal actions 
or personal references of his bringing prospective new members into the fold. There were 
a few members who spent part of their time, at least from what the ICG documentation 
describes, as limited recruiters. However, what may be different now, is that trusted 
members who were directly recruited by Noordin or his top deputies are now in prison. 
Their qualifications and trust may or may not be diminished, but they may play an 
important part as references for candidates who are about to be released from 
incarceration. These men will play an important part of our infiltration scheme. 
5. A Systems and CARVER Analysis of Noordin’s Network  
Remembering that the CARVER method of analysis is an acknowledgement that 
systems are built upon systems, it follows that a systems understanding of the task at 
hand is required. In our current range of documentation, there is limited information 
about the larger jihadist economies in SE Asia and Oceania. A complete CARVER 
analysis of Noordin’s networks is not possible because the relational data about the 
jihadist meso- and macro-networks outside of Indonesia and between surrounding layers 
of traditional Muslim organizations are unavailable. However, we do have an 
understanding of the systems within Noordin’s networks, their purpose, and where some 
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of them originated. Figure 40 depicts a simplified interpretation of the operational-level 
system at work in Noordin’s terror campaign.  
 
Figure 40. The primary system at work in Noordin’s terror campaign may be referred 
to as a terror success cycle. Success at each point has a positive influence on the next. A 
CT campaign must break that reinforcing cycle. 
In this simple system, successful terrorist attacks detract from the population’s 
perception of the Indonesian authorities’ legitimacy and ability to govern. That inability 
to govern becomes realized as people withdraw participation and seek alternative 
authorities and narratives that align more closely with their needs. Islamist narratives 
such as JI’s call to jihad and vision of a wider Islamic state and future caliphate resonate 
with a portion of the Indonesian population. As that sentiment grows, jihadist 
organizations such as Noordin’s benefit from the increased mobilization of recruits and 
resources, particularly if the original attacks can be attributed to certain organizations. 
Subsequent iterations of this cycle reinforce the social dynamics instigated by the 
previous iterations. Advantageously for groups like Noordin’s, mobilization becomes an 
absorption capacity problem and groups require channels in which to funnel the recruits, 
resources and increased social capital. Figure 41 is a more complex systems view of 
Noordin’s terror campaign comprised mostly of the internal systems and the major 
external system they seek to influence.   
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In the next lower level of analysis—an internal or tactical systems view—we see 
the seven dark network functions come into play. When popular appeal of jihadist 
narratives and proposed solutions begin to overtake government influence (due to 
diminished support for Indonesian governmental control) people may begin to take a 
greater interest in the action behind the narrative. With this interest, not only does the 
number of prospective recruits increase, but so do volume and types of resources as well 
as opportunities for expansion of operations. Successful exploitation of the new popular 
interest will allow the network leadership the space to determine how best to continue to 
prosecute their struggle against the authorities: to change nothing, to expand direct 
control (centralize), or to release some level of control (decentralize) to allow subordinate 
networks to operate more freely.  
 
Figure 41. A systems view of Noordin’s terror campaign focusing on his network’s 
functions (in boxes).  
Figure 41 illustrates a systems view of these dynamics, with all seven dark 
network functions able to expand. The seven dark network functions all contribute to the 
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internal health of the organization, which culminates in a reinforcing cycle of successful 
terror operations, diminished state’s ability to govern, ideological appeal, and improved 
health of the organization. So, the internal health of the organization is inversely related 
to the relative power of the authority. An obvious conclusion is that counterterrorism or 
counterinsurgent campaigns should culminate not only in preventing dark network 
attacks, but should degrade the overall health of the network by disrupting the success 
cycle. 
From the data we have, it is possible to map out the relational data both for 
membership and functions within the context of Noordin’s overall terror campaign. 
CARVER analysis supported by analysis of gaps within the surviving network reveals 
come critical vulnerabilities. Namely, those are the functions most negatively impacted in 
terms of ability to support the larger network: ideology, resourcing and sanctuary. But 
these functions are not equally deficient in the current state of the network. That uneven 
distribution of lost capability also means there are functions that require much more rapid 
growth than others. Rapid re-growth can be exploited. 
 
Figure 42. Tactical CARVER analysis of Noordin’s network functions. Resourcing 
and Sanctuary are chosen as the best for tactical targeting. Leadership is also ranked very 
high, but has the lowest score for accessibility, which stems from the current  inability to 
directly attack Noordin or other leadership figures. 
 120 
A CARVER matrix (Figure 42) developed from the mechanism attrition 
assessments depicts values assigned for identifying which systems to target. While all 
systems may be attacked at some level, Resourcing and Sanctuary are chosen because 
they have suffered the most damage in terms of support capacity to the overall network. 
If Noordin and his co-conspirators are to remain free, and restore freedom of movement 
in order to re-gain access to recruits, resources and targeting opportunities, then they will 
need to have rapid re-generation of these mechanisms.   
6. Key Players 
Question 3. Is there a path for access to key players? 
No, there is no known direct path from incarcerated members to the members still 
at-large. Presuming the Indonesian authorities are competently distilling the intelligence 
they collect and effectively pursuing leads, there is currently no direct path to key 
members of Noordin’s network that presents itself from the ICG documentation. The 
majority of the peripheral members have been culled from the core and Noordin’s 
remaining contacts appear to be skilled or lucky enough to evade capture. Further 
investigation of members’ backgrounds or more effective interrogation of the imprisoned 
members may lead to more useful information. However, there are some members who 
can be theoretically templated as having enough historical social connections that they 
may be useful. Those members may be elevated in priority for rehabilitation and 
reintegration programs, and possible recruitment into a program to employ them against 
their former comrades. In this way, we can construct the necessary network pathways to 
give us the access and placement we need to prevent attacks and bring an end Noordin’s 
terror campaign. 
7. Broadcast Access 
Question 4. Is there a method for broadcast access to key players? 
Yes. Even if the surviving and at-large members went underground, they are 
likely not totally isolated from the effect of mass media. These members and their 
supporters do not live in a bubble. Merely surviving, they must still receive aid from 
supporters such as sanctuary, food, water, information, and communication via cut-outs 
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and intermediaries between one another. If they seek to re-constitute an effective action 
network, then even more communication and flow of resources and personnel must 
occur. The same roadside signs and establishments that psychologically impact innocent 
travelers also impact the members and their supporters. Local chatter around watering 
holes, eating establishments and other businesses is openly shared with all who pass by. 
Previously untapped resources are already influenced by information passed by 
television, radio, printed media, the Internet and word of mouth. If Noordin and his top 
surviving lieutenants are indeed rebuilding their network to some semblance of its former 
self, then they must reach out, risking identification and compromise or capture. There is 
certainly room for psychological and information operations to inform and influence 
local populations in the vicinity of suspected sanctuary regions, such as central Java. 
Short of utter isolation, information distributed via broadcast means is sure to reach 
Noordin and his people, and guaranteed to reach his potential future accomplices who 
live in the region. 
In today’s increasingly technological world, using any level of electronic 
technology for communication, navigation, or computing very nearly automatically 
means a certain vulnerability to electronic exploitation. 
8. Access and Placement 
Question 5. Is there a path for placement within key information or resource 
 pools or streams? 
 
Yes. This requires an in-depth look into the mechanisms that comprised 
Noordin’s fully-functioning network of 2002–2005 and determine what is necessary and 
sufficient to reconstitute an effective insurgent or terror organization. To do this, we 
examine the full network of 2002–05, subtract what has been dismantled or degraded and 
compare to an idealized model of network structures that supports a healthy and effective 
organization as described in Chapter 5. By following historical recruitment 
mechanisms—trusted jihadist organizations and schools—we can place ourselves within 
the sanctuary and resourcing mechanisms with the full resources available to state 
intelligence agencies. Coming to the table with greater resources than other jihadist 
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competition (aka other jihadists with access to various weapons, explosives, safe sites, 
funds, and the like will assist in tipping the balance to the authorities’ favor. The local 
genuine jihadist resource providers will not be able to compete and will get squeezed out. 
Infiltrating these critical and (as of 2006) depleted mechanisms means filling the void 
created by attrition of members and making certain scarce resources available via trained 
intelligence agents and recruited former jihadis.   
The sanctuary and resourcing mechanisms are not random sub-networks which 
happen to be available. These degraded mechanisms are open wounds in very central 
functions that touch the core of Noordin’s network. Key players must live somewhere 
safe, and operations cannot be planned or executed without confidence of resource 
availability. The result of successful infiltration like this is two-fold. First, the safe site 
mechanism provides awareness of the movements, patterns and locations of key players. 
Proper technological surveillance of these sites also notifies authorities of plans and 
intentions. Second, owning a portion (or the entirety) of the resource mechanism allows a 
level of control over the timing and method of future operations.   
Discovery of the remaining members’ methods of communications on the Internet 
will also provide excellent access to information based on real-time flows of ideas and 
directives. The anonymity of chat rooms can work against the terrorist as well as in their 
favor. Identification and exploitation of Internet domains that are utilized by Noordin’s 
people will go a long way toward understanding precisely who is dependent upon whom 
and for what, and may give indicators as to what kind of cognitive and task loads 
different members are bearing. Monitoring their communications will also give 
independent confirmation of other operations’ effectiveness. 
9. Options for Action 
Question 6. What options for action are made available by the network’s current 
 state? 
 
There are two perspectives to this question:  what is possible and what is not 
allowed by laws, treaties and agreements. Included in this equation are the internal and 
external aspects of the network’s situation as allowed or constrained by U.S and 
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Indonesian national laws and international treaties. In that light, there are several 
approaches available for intervention against Noordin’s network and a few that are 
disallowed. First, an example of an action that would be disallowed under the 
circumstances for the time period when the ICG document was written. The importance 
of geo-spatial intelligence—knowing where the enemy is geographically—is obviously 
important in this example. 
Unilateral kinetic targeting when high-value individuals, or HVIs, are inside 
Indonesia’s sovereign territorial waters or land mass requires direct intervention into that 
nation’s sovereignty and is not currently a policy of the U.S. government. Any military 
action would need explicit approval from the Indonesian government. There is also the 
option of conducting a covert action, but that requires a Presidential finding which must 
be specific to the national security of the U.S.214   
Kinetic targeting of HVIs in international territories such as the open seas or in 
ungoverned spaces on land, direct intervention is more likely to be allowed from a legal 
perspective. This would also require a Presidential finding unless special provisions or 
policies such as a declared war or invocation of the right of self-defense could be 
established.215  Other nations’ desires may also factor in decisions to intervene.   
Specifically, Australia would likely have a strong desire to lead or participate in such an 
action since many of the dead and injured from the 2003–05 attacks are Australian 
citizens, and particularly for the 2004 Australian embassy bombing.  
Here, however, the dark network in question is mostly land-based. The issue is 
not that there is no precedent for such activities, but that the threshold for authorization 
for these actions is much higher than in a declared combat zone, and the U.S. had no such 
policies in place for pursuing Noordin. This is one example of the legal aspects of 
terrorism, counterterrorism and international assistance against a lethal enemy, in 
irregular warfare. That being said, there are numerous options that are feasible and 
contribute directly to a strategic approach to supporting Indonesia’s struggle with 
domestic violent jihad. Every category of action proscribed by Roberts and Everton is on 
the table: 
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U.S.-unilateral kinetic targeting in international waters may be permissible. 
International laws allow for military actions in international waters when the threat falls 
within certain parameters, particularly when a country invokes its inherent right of self-
defense. Whenever contacts of Noordin’s—or Noordin himself—can be tracked while 
transiting between sovereign territories, we are legally allowed to conduct a kinetic 
surgical strike to kill or capture them. 
Kinetic targeting capacity building is a hybrid of the direct and indirect 
approaches. We can build up the capabilities of Indonesian and regional actors to support 
law enforcement investigations, domestic and international intelligence collection and 
prosecutions that support their own kill or capture operations in their own 
counterterrorism campaign. Ideally, this would be linked to institution building, wherever 
necessary. 
Indonesia’s military, legal, law enforcement, and judicial institutions are lagging 
behind the cutting edge of effective security and governance in the 21st century. The 
United States’ federal government has the means to assist with nearly all aspects of 
intelligence processes and sharing, counterterrorism, law enforcement, and judicial 
practices. Many departments and agencies are the disposal of the lead agency, which here 
ought to be the Department of State, supported by the Defense Department, Justice, the 
CIA, Treasury, just to name a few. 
Psychological Operations, or as is now known as Military Information Support 
Operations or MISO, are bit more problematic. Information operations can be very broad 
and deep, including a very wide range of offensive, defensive and exploitative actions216 
of any computer systems discovered in the employment by Noordin’s members, well as 
any systems in use by the organizations that share members or mechanisms with 
Noordin’s network. Exploitation of Noordin’s technical systems (i.e., via the Internet) 
augments the interference of the social systems via other means. No sovereign nation 
desires the U.S. to conduct information operations against it citizens. This is one instance 
of where the U.S. military may have to work with and through the Indonesian armed 
forces and domestic security apparatus to implement an effective information campaign 
in support of the overall strategy against Noordin.   
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Here, also, is an instance where a non-attributable third party could act on our 
behalf, wittingly or unwittingly, to inject harmful truthful information or misinformation 
into the social environment. Deception and deniability is critical to outside influence into 
the affairs of another society. In network terms, there would be a filter of structural holes 
and gate keepers whom no unwelcome probe could pass or circumvent. Again, this is a 
political choice filled with risk due to enormous uncertainty and high costs. But, it can be 
done. 
10. Resources Available 
Question 7.  Are the necessary resources and personnel mobilized or available for 
 action?  
 
This question is answered in three parts. First, in practical terms for this 
environment, the question is a matter of international and interagency coordination and 
synchronization. For this reason, governments implement policy and priorities for such 
large and complex problems by designating a task force specially composed of 
appropriate agency representation, empowered and resourced appropriately for the work 
required. Those high-level governmental mechanisms are beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but the second part of this issue is core to the methodology described and must be 
understood by all levels of such a task force. 
The second part of making resources available is answered by synchronization of 
efforts across the range of strategic options. Most of the people and tools necessary to 
defeat a network such as Noordin’s and within Indonesia are not members of the U.S. 
government and must be either provided by the Indonesian government or recruited into 
the operation.    
The final part of the mobilization discussion is that there are oftentimes grass-
roots organizations or loosely-affiliated groups already doing the work, but not in a 
synchronized or coordinated manner. This may be desirable for the aspects of a campaign 
that involve exponentially larger efforts than targeting, such as institution building or 
reintegration and rehabilitation programs. One such example is the Singaporean 
community-based initiatives.217  A government or other entity may be able to mobilize, 
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fund and synchronize such groups that enables a greater impact through concentration of 
efforts and resources.   
E. A STRATEGY FOR ATTACKING NOORDIN’S NETWORK 
Our answers to the intervention decision tree questions, derived by following the 
Special Operations Target Network Analysis Process, bring us to a conclusion that there 
are multiple ways and means to disrupt, degrade and intervene against Noordin’s terror 
network both in the short and the long term. I propose that our desired ends are not 
achieved by a silver bullet tactic or weapon, but would be best achieved by a symphony 
of complimentary intervention methods and tools that would bring about a tipping 
point218 by creating vulnerabilities or exploiting those that already exist. Thus, the 
strategy I propose is not to employ a single strategy or a few of the strategies described 
by Roberts and Everton, but a strategy of simultaneous lines of effort across most or all 
of those categories of action resulting in a combination of subversion of the network itself 
and of poisoning the network neighborhood against it.  
Illustrated in a model derived from Dr. Gordon McCormick’s diamond model of 
counterinsurgency,219 the overall strategy is one that pits the U.S. and Indonesian 
governments against Noordin’s network using the Indonesian government-supportive 
portion of the Indonesian society to positively influence the non-supportive portion 
(Noordin’s support base) to peel it away from Noordin’s ideological draw (and that of 
other Islamic jihadist groups) simultaneously attacking the network directly whenever 
doing so will degrade the internal health of the network. The overall intent is to isolate 
and betray Noordin and his co-conspirators to the Indonesian authorities.  
Using the framework illustrated in Figure 43, the chosen strategy requires bi-
lateral actions and access to resources using U.S. and Indonesian strengths in a 
complimentary fashion. While some actions may be direct and provide immediate 
feedback, such as the kinetic targeting and law enforcement actions, some activities will 
require levels of Indonesian political and social consensus that endure for years. Those 
areas include improved protection of those soft targets known for their appeal to Islamic 
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terrorist attacks, rehabilitation and reintegration through effective prison reform, 
community policing and local governance development. Executed and funded properly, 
and with a sensitivity to cultural realities, these efforts ought to have the cumulative 
effect of moving the Indonesian government toward solutions in the two essential 
mutually-reinforcing problems of local governance reform and an especially violent 
jihadist terror organization operating within Indonesian territory. Thus, we address those 
two problems coherently: attack the network directly via kinetic and non-kinetic methods, 
and attack it indirectly by non-kinetic methods that reshape the social environment to 
isolate Noordin and improve Indonesia’s ability to govern in social sectors that provide 
support to him. 
 
Figure 43. A model of a basic strategy to intervene against Noordin’s network. The 
dashed line between the U.S. Government (USG) and Noordin indicates the relatively 
limited manner in which the USG can directly attack or influence Noordin’s network. 
To detail the strategy, Figure  44 depicts the several lines of effort necessary to 
holistically achieve the desired effects. There are several efforts that must occur 
simultaneously as they are complementary. Some efforts are successive and contingent 
upon previous actions. One such example is the actions involving development of 
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intelligence collection within the local-government-unsupportive portion of the 
Indonesian population. Significant to this thesis, another example is the spotting, 
assessing, development and employment of former prison inmates associated with 
Noordin’s network, or groups or individuals closely associated with him, as “pseudo 
gang” members to infiltrate into their former jihadist organization to collect and report 
information about key leader actions and intentions. After a brief description of the 
general strategy, a detailed section on the advantages of SONAP as applied to pseudo 
operations follows and concludes this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 44. An overall strategy for attacking Noordin’s network. The arrows of like 
colors represent bilateral lines of effort that require synchronization and complementary 
actions and resources. All efforts should be synchronized and complimentary. 
 
1. Indirect and Direct Components of the Strategy 
The indirect component is intended to re-shape the pool of society that is 
sympathetic to violent jihad. Re-shaping the social environment and influencing 
Noordin’s network neighborhood includes prison reform, better governance in the jihad-
sympathetic portion of the Indonesian population, better protecting the friendly sectors of 
Indonesian society via community policing, and target hardening. Working with and 
through local communities for governance assistance in building institutions capable of 
countering violent jihadist appeal is also useful. These macro-level changes are difficult 
to measure, so we must focus on a smaller, more measurable scale. Here, we look inside 
Noordin’s network at the health of the organization itself. 
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 The direct component of the strategy is to attack the network by 
employing PsyOp, IO, and U.S.-assisted Indonesian kinetic operations supported by 
development of their own CT capabilities and technological and human capacity of 
modern counter-terror methods. Employing F3EAD will involve getting inside Noordin’s 
network’s information cycles and, here, literally inside his organization. These functions 
are informed by intelligence operations, or sustained deliberate actions to collect defined 
and measurable information. 
The Indonesian government requires early warning of impending attacks at the 
very least, if not some form of predictive analysis of where key players will be and when 
and in what posture. They may even choose to create a rapid reaction capability to react 
to warnings and prevent attacks or through which to attack the network itself. We also 
need to be able to measure the effects of the other lines of effort upon the health of the 
organization. Simply measuring the frequency or lack of attacks is a poor measurement of 
success, and is more an expression of Noordin’s successes at the micro level. Inside the 
organization, trust is the lifeblood through which members live and die. To that end, we 
will pry open the organization through the holes created by attrition and slip inside. We 
will infiltrate the sanctuary and weapons procurement mechanisms by investing in a 
specific set of relationships, starting with targeted individuals within the prison 
population who may be turned against their former comrades. We seek former criminals 
or insurgents who would be willing and able to effectively work for the other side.   
This is achieved through a series of rehabilitation and reintegration programs 
which are already necessary for de-radicalizing the Indonesian prison population. With 
passive supervision and constant mentorship from a trusted confidant, the targeted 
individual(s) sway from their previous jihadist path to one of reconciliation and, perhaps, 
one enacting their renewed loyalty by assisting their country’s law enforcement and 
counterterrorism efforts against their former co-conspirators. The most promising 
prospects are selected for recruitment and very special training. One method of 
employing them is in a complex and highly sensitive intelligence activity known as 
pseudo operations. 
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2. Pseudo Operations or Mechanism Replacement Operations 
Pseudo operations are employment of individuals or small teams of government-
supported or government-friendly agents feigning as insurgents, normally along with 
bona fide insurgent defectors, infiltrate enemy insurgent groups for purposes of 
intelligence collection or direct action raids for kill or capture missions, or both. 
Historically, these are predominantly intelligence operations supporting targeting or 
conducted by special operations components of national law enforcement agencies.220   
For our purposes here, pseudo operations are inherently exploitative of structural 
holes in dark networks, and are especially attracted to regions or nodes of structural 
equivalence surrounded by structural holes. This is particularly true for missions that seek 
replacement of or brokerage between Key Player nodes. If pseudo teams are not trying to 
inject their own information into the network, then they are taking advantage of a lack of 
brokerage or Simmelian ties in order to disrupt the overall workings of the network. In 
SONAP concept terms, pseudo operations are individual or segmental mechanism 
replacement strategies for any purpose necessary—intelligence monitoring, influence or 
elimination of threat nodes, cells or mechanisms. The more embedded a node is, the 
better to replace it with a pseudo team or agent. Then the effects will be felt across a 
broader portion of the network and the team will be more aware of information across the 
network. Embeddedness is a social network perspective of access and placement, and 
pseudo operations seek to maximize it. 
Pseudo operations have a checkered history of strategic effectiveness against 
insurgents, where foreign or other military forces of dissimilar ethnic composition may 
infiltrate an enemy force or group to collect intelligence or to conduct attacks with 
intimate knowledge of enemy locations, plans, force composition and strength. This is 
mostly due to the fact that most counterinsurgency campaigns are slow to emerge as 
political priorities and most military or intelligence operations subsequently arise quickly 
with much experimentation. Significant uses of pseudo forces were most notably by the 
British in Kenya against the Mau Mau (1952–60) and in Malaya (1948–60) against the 
ethnic Chinese communist insurgents, by the white Rhodesian military in the Rhodesian 
bush war against ZANLA and ZIPRA communist insurgents (1964–79) and by the 
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French in Algeria in the late 1950s’ “Battle of Algiers.”221  The Selous Scouts were 
employed to great advantage both internally and outside of Rhodesia’s borders, but 
strategic results were mixed.222 
Advantages to effective pseudo operations are three-fold. Included are, 1) 
extremely accurate and timely intelligence due to uniquely powerful access and 
placement, 2) a general ability to affect situations in a timely manner due to being on-site 
and 3) even when one or more teams are compromised or insurgents suspect their 
existence, trust can be eroded or destroyed between real insurgent or terrorist groups 
because they do not know who they are dealing with. In our situation with Noordin’s 
network, timing is important because Noordin is reconstructing his network right now. If 
we get our pseudo teams recruited, developed and deployed soon, then we can infiltrate 
his network as he hastens to call upon his weak ties to reconstruct his operative 
mechanisms and access to critical resources. 
3. Lessons of Past Pseudo Operations 
Although there were governments that benefited from pseudo operations, there 
was usually a high political cost when actions and effects were not controlled as well as 
they could have been. Learning lessons from these experiences is key to ensuring success 
in Indonesia. Read these lessons learned with an eye toward Roberts’ and Everton’s 
typologies of strategic choices of counterterrorism methods: 
1. Money counts. Money incentivizes and rewards, but must be used 
discriminately and in tune with other cultural mores. For the pseudo gang member, the 
risk must be worth it. 
2. Alternatives to participation can be dire. While money can incentivize, there 
must be a severe punishment that is known to all and is an effective deterrent to re-
defecting back to the terror network. 
3. Coordination is critical. The agency employing pseudo teams must strike a 
balance between synchronization of information across agencies and military units to 
ensure the safety of the teams and other friendly units, and security of information to 
prevent unwanted disclosures that could lead to team compromises and loss of access and 
placement. 
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4. Successful pseudo operations depend upon response forces. If a pseudo team 
has time-sensitive information, conventional military forces or law enforcement agencies 
need to be able to react quickly and efficiently. In this light, a special unit may have to be 
designated or created that is responsible for effective reactions to pseudo team alerts. 
5. Breaking enemy communications is key. Effective centralized communications 
and control of members is bad for pseudo team operations. Pseudo teams rely upon a 
certain level of anonymity in order to operate within the ambiguity and uncertainty of 
dark networks. If Noordin maintains a very high centrality measurement throughout his 
reconstruction period, that could mean extreme difficulty in inserting a pseudo team into 
that high-trust environment. The bona fides used to introduce a team under such 
circumstances must be very, very strong and have plenty of backstop. For this strategy to 
work, the CT forces must breach enemy communications via IO and the pseudo team 
members must be embedded with the necessary jihadist organizations that will provide 
effective back-story. 
6. “Turned” terrorists are critical. Any familiarity with the internal insurgent or 
terrorist environment—key people, locations, processes, or language—is an important 
asset that cannot be overlooked. A turned terrorist is valuable both deployed in the field 
and as an information source concerning the internal network environment. This can be 
as simple as knowing names and descriptions of network members, to knowing the secret 
passwords and procedures for verifying identification and the latest ideological talking 
points. The better-disciplined regions of Noordin’s networks will be more difficult to 
penetrate because of the history of trusted relations used by Noordin and his core 
members. 223 
It is apparent that these lessons in pseudo operations are not confined to the 
military sphere. There are points to be made in most categories of action in Roberts’ and 
Everton’s typologies of strategic choices concerning counterterrorism. As these pseudo 
operations begin, several supporting campaigns must already be underway. The effects of 
each must be complementary, as successful pseudo operations cannot exist without 
effective recruitment of turned terrorists or supporters, and terrorists or their supporters 
cannot be turned without effective reconciliation. Effective reconciliation begins with an 
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effective prison system and follow-on social systems to continue the re-integration 
process, which in Indonesia must be reformed. 
Targeting the sanctuary and weapons procurement mechanisms for infiltration by 
our pseudo teams, we look to the current field of incarcerated members. There are two 
categories of pseudo members for our purposes here. First is the key informant, the man 
or woman who can give us insight into key functions, identities and locations and may 
not be suitable for deployment as a pseudo team member for infiltration back into their 
old network. Second is the deployable pseudo agent or pseudo team member. This is a 
man or woman who was previously close to the key informant, perhaps structurally 
equivalent, was of lesser status in the network, but knows at least some of the same 
people and can provide valid bona fides to speak with active members and gain their trust 
for the remainder of his pseudo team.   
4. Detailed Analysis for Infiltration Access and Placement 
There are two fields of measurements for success in the SONAP model: those 
directly impacting the network’s and pseudo teams’ status, and those indirectly impacting 
that status.*  Initial and direct measurements of success are recruitment (wide acceptance 
of the pseudo team as part of the group), activation (initial requests or demands for 
support from them), promotion of the pseudo team leader to a higher status in the group, 
and reinforcement or operational expansion putting the pseudo team at the core of the 
larger mechanism or multiple mechanisms. This positive elevation of the status of the 
pseudo team can be characterized by measurable increases in direct relations to other 
network members  
The best candidate for a pseudo team member with access and placement near 
Dharmawan is Ubeid. While he was merely a courier in his prior operational time, he has 
the proper academic credentials: he is an Ngruki, Darusyahadah, and An-Nur graduate. 
He is in his twenties and from Ngawi, East Java. He is a JI member and Mindanao 
veteran. He is fluent in Arabic. He was arrested in July 2004 and sentenced to three and a 
half years in May 2005. Therefore, his release time permits ample preparation and 
                                                 
* Refer to Chapter V, Figure 26 for the network status graphic. 
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training time. What makes his contribution the strongest is his enormous 2-degree reach 
across the network (see Figure 45) that also includes much of the main component of the 
residual 2006 network. 
 
Figure 45. Ubeid’s egonet (left) and 2-degree egonet (right). Reinsertion into the 
network could be validated by Suramto. Box-shaped nodes represent incarcerated 
members, circle-shaped nodes represent members still at large in 2006. 
While no one can come close to replicating Noordin’s 40% 1-degree reach across 
the network, Ubeid comes close with his 2-degree reach, and most (more than 50%) of 
those members are 1-degree away from Noordin.   This makes him a significant source of 
information (within the jailed population, at least) of Noordin’s core members’ 
descriptions, intentions, and life patterns. After making contact with the network via 
Suramto, perhaps he can fulfill expectations in his new role as the sanctuary chief, or at 
least as a safe house network manager.  
The next-strongest candidate to Ubeid for sanctuary mechanism infiltration is 
Bagus Budi Pranoto (aka Urwah) (see Figure 46). He is an Indonesian recruiter with 
distinction: he helped bring Iwan Dharmawan on board for the Noordin-led embassy 
bombing operation in 2004. He attended al-Mutaqien, Jepara, Universitas an-Nur, which 
means he has more than one layer of educational commonality with many prominent 
figures in the organization. After being detained, he was sentenced to three and a half 
years, in May 2005. Just as with Ubeid, if selected, his sentence would only have to be 
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slightly abbreviated, if preparation and training permits. Urwah’s possible points of 
contact for re-establishing relations with the network are Suramto and Saptono. 
 
Figure 46. Urwah's egonet (left) and 2-degree egonet (right).  Suramto and Saptono 
are his at-large contacts within the network. 
In terms of resourcing mechanism/weapons procurement pseudo team member 
options, there are two potential pseudo team leaders, each with direct ties to Noordin and 
a small group of relations both at large and in jail: Abdullah Sunata and Ahmad Rofiq 
Ridho. In depth analysis of each of these men reveals significant opportunities and 
drawbacks. 
First, there are some commonalities worth discussing:  each of the men has 3–4 
surviving acquaintances still at large. These men could possibly provide a form of bona 
fides and a path for re-contacting Noordin. Unfortunately, neither man has any relations 
still at large that also have a direct relationship with Noordin; this would be a much better 
form of bona fides once the pseudo team is employed. Another commonality is that each 
has a good group of facilitators and couriers. This is important because these roles 
include enough diverse tasks and activities that there is ample uncontrollable ambiguity 
for extra-organizational contacts (i.e.: an undercover handler or other government agent, 
or a choice of venues in which to introduce a pseudo team). In short, each man presents 
his own possibilities and risks. 
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Figure 47. Abdullah Sunata’s egonet (left) and 2-degree egonet (right).   As with all 
the candidates, Sunata exhibits a moderate degree centrality and eigenvector centrality. 
Abdullah Sunata (Figure 47) is Indonesian and was head of the KOMPAK office 
in Ambon from 2000–2001. After his arrest, he was sentenced to seven years in prison in 
April 2006 for withholding information about Noordin’s whereabouts and additionally 
charged with illegal possession of weapons. Ironically, Noordin tried to get him to join 
forces in 2004, but he refused. This last fact may be key in opening Sunata to cooperating 
with us. Sunata has several options for re-establishing contact with the network: 
Dulmatin, Enceng Kurnia, or Umar Patek.  
Ahmad Rofiq Ridho (Figure 48) is Indonesian and was a courier for Noordin in 
2004. He is a Ngruki alumnus which puts him in a higher class within the organization. 
He lost two relatives—his brother, Fathurrahman al-Ghozi, and cousin, Jabir, were killed. 
He has combat experience as a veteran of Ambon and he is a member of JI. He was 
arrested in July, 2005, and sentenced to seven years beginning in April 2006. He had 
access into the financing branch of the resourcing mechanism while he was active; he is 
one of only two currently surviving donations middlemen. Donations can come from 
anywhere, and the cover for his access to increased funding can be easily explained by 
contacts made within the prison system. This is an excellent way to disburse untraceable 
“mystery” funding via clandestine Indonesian or USG accounts and cash hand-overs. 
Ridho also has several options for re-contacting the network as well as a couple of 
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isolates:  Umar Patek and Enceng Kurnia are with the network and Abdul Rohinm and 
Mus’ab Sahidi are the isolates. 
 
 
Figure 48. Ahmad Rofiq Ridho’s egonet (left) and 2-degree egonet (right). Re-
introducing Ridho to the network, but as a turned pseudo team member, could be a 
significant accomplishment. 
These pseudo team candidates will become members of a largely Indonesian 
intelligence or law enforcement-run pseudo operation, conducted with U.S. assistance. 
The larger operation surrounding the pseudo teams involves much more than the 
aforementioned prison and reintegration processes. In order for these teams to become 
established in their cover stories and roles, there must be two dynamics in play, 
regardless of which mechanisms they are infiltrating. First, their own stories and 
resources must check out under scrutiny, the weak ties to the schools, for example, must 
be made apparent. Information operations must support them by providing technological 
back-story and advantages over teams’ competitors—other groups in the same market as 
they are, so to speak. If there are other weapons providers, for example, then they must be 
raided by law enforcement, or put out of business, underbid, suspected of collaboration or 
otherwise discredited. There can be an air of suspicion built around their Internet 
presence whether it is missing or false emails, bank errors that suddenly drain funds or 
otherwise draw unwanted attention of authorities or other network members.   
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Second, and more to the indirect approach, psychological operations and positive 
influences from institution building and prison reform (mainly de-radicalizing integrative 
and rehabilitative programs) must begin to poison the network’s environment. This 
should have the dual effects of reducing the pool of resources as well as increasing the 
perceptions of good governance. Where the more direct approach makes things easier for 
our teams to operate, these and other non-kinetic methods are designed to make things 
harder for the dark networks to operate. Only through this two-pronged approach can 
Indonesia reduce the threat from jihadist terrorism. 
In the manner described here, the Special Operations Network Analysis Process 
can directly contribute to implementation of a multi-lateral approach to countering 
terrorism. Understanding a targeted dark network’s internal and external structures assists 
in understanding the social systems which exist inside and outside the network’s 
boundaries. Key to enabling a campaign of great scale and magnitude as this one is 
selecting tactics and techniques sufficient to collect the amount of information necessary 
from the right places—such as pseudo operations, information operations via the Internet, 
and exploiting the positive effects of prison reform (in this instance). Then, using 
established tools to understand the network mechanisms and how their structure allows 
them to exploit the surrounding social systems is critical to determining key players, key 
mechanisms, and measuring their vulnerabilities. Above all, embedding proper agents 
inside such systems is the most advantageous way to achieve inside information– turning 
on the light in a dark network, so to speak. Once we achieve proper access and 
placement, then we may measure the real impacts of all the other efforts applied to such a 
campaign and know when, where and how to act to keep the enemy off balance and 




VII. CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
 
Understanding and attacking terror and insurgent networks in the modern age 
requires a model that not only accounts for complexity in social networks, but also a 
strategy that takes advantage of social systems in the same manner that the terrorists do. 
All of the parties involved must make do with the tools and systems they have, and 
collaboration between parties is vital for success. Each party moves freely in and takes 
full advantage of the social networks that are most like them, they infiltrate and exploit 
the social structures that constitute contested human terrain, and attempt to intervene 
against key locations within those networks and systems that support or constitute the 
enemy. Using the Special Operations Network Assessment Process, or SONAP, informed 
by a systems understanding of social structures internal and external to a network under 
analysis, evaluates network member criticality, accessibility, role or function 
recuperability, and vulnerabilities of a particular location in a network, the effects of 
intervention at that location, and recognizability of specific members and positions in the 
network. The sum of the process can reveal the social structures of opportunities and 
risks for intervening against a dark network. 
SONAP combines the Special Forces CARVER target analysis tool with several 
concepts from SNA to produce a method to estimate dark network structural patterns and 
properties and measure structural changes. The six factors in CARVER analysis have 
some close analogs within SNA, which make some of the SONAP combinations a rather 
natural fit. Some SNA concepts play a strong role in identifying mechanisms and other 
structures with CARVER, such as structural holes, centrality and density. SONAP also 
offers a range of intervention methods and approaches to maximize the structural and 
cognitive degradation of a dark network, as well as a way to measure the structural 
effects of intervention or other influences upon the network. 
The implications of developing and implementing SONAP for military special 
operations forces, law enforcement and intelligence agencies are enormous. The 
conventional U.S. military has not embraced SNA as a tool—nor accepted the human 
domain as a valid concept—and is therefore unable to implement SONAP. For years, the 
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U.S. military and intelligence agencies have disaggregated terror, insurgent or resistance 
organizations into sub-groups by attributes, ignoring social relational data. In so doing, 
we have missed significant opportunities to understand social networks, especially when 
trying to intervene against dark networks in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Tools 
like SONAP can help overcome our methodological shortfalls and illustrate to us the 
mechanisms and patterns of dark networks.  
A high level of competence in using a systemic approach, like SONAP, in 
understanding terror networks and the social systems in which they move can lead to 
increasingly efficient processes of intervening through the human terrain. There is 
nothing revolutionary about SONAP. It is composed of existing theories and established 
practices arranged in an order that assists in selecting methods to reach key players in 
critical social structures within a targeted network.   Especially in the Internet age, 
everything about SONAP is accessible to any agency concerned with violent groups that 
exploit weakly-controlled social spaces. Only the technologies, authorities and funding 
allowed by law will limit the depth and breadth of any investigation and intervention 
strategy implementation. 
The conceptual work is not finished, however, and the opportunities for practical 
applications are deep and wide and as varied as there is the funding and will to 
experiment. There are several areas that could use more research and validation. First, 
SNA as a family of concepts and tools is still wide open for experimentation and full of 
pitfalls.224  And the most severe factor in analyzing dark networks is trying to account for 
the unknown amounts of missing data—the undiscovered artifacts of dark networks. Data 
collection of dark network social relations is problematic at best, and the work of SNA in 
general—while technical—is very much an art to be explored with alternative hypotheses 
and analyses being the rule rather than exception.    
Second, the analytical model must be usable at all levels of analysis. Contrary to 
the 2006 dataset used here to explore these concepts, the real world is not static and 
evolves simultaneously strategically and tactically, and at varying speeds. SNA tools 
must be adaptable to real-time information as it becomes available and be able to display 
modified or alternative outcomes to new information. While this is not necessary for 
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designing entire military or counterterrorism campaigns, it is necessary for tactical- and 
operational-level intelligence analysis and mission planning. The methods of collection, 
reporting, synthesis and display need to at least keep pace with the speed of today’s 
counterterrorism operations. For the slow-motion strategic unfolding of unconventional 
warfare or foreign internal defense campaigns (such as counterinsurgencies), the value of 
SONAP will be in the common language used and broad range of analysis made possible 
as applied from the tactical to the strategic levels of analysis and planning. The value of a 
common language for articulating analysis in every domain and at every level is 
inestimable. 
Lastly, the biggest challenge for implementing tools such as SONAP is the 
flexibility and adaptability of the organizations that need it. Within organizations charged 
with intervening in irregular warfare environments, the analysts, operators, commanders, 
and their tools need to be able to understand and support the emergent creative 
destruction that their missions require. And they need to be able to incorporate new ideas 
and methods rapidly. This organizational adaptability and flexibility is why SOF are 
capable of incorporating SONAP into their arsenal. The concerns reach into the most 
important aspects of an organization:  leadership, management, organizational patterns 
and internal systems and processes. Above all, the leadership must be comfortable with 
ambiguity and uncertainty in their decision making. The scope and scale of the 
complexity at all levels demand maximal organizational adaptation not just conceptually, 
but practically as well. After all is said and done, in ambiguous and uncertain irregular 
warfare domains like counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and unconventional warfare, 
organizations adapt or die. 
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